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ABSTRACT
The Oromo people of Ethiopia share a common language, worldview, set of
sacred meanings, and a historic system of governance. The rise of the Abyssinian Empire
in the late 1800s led to the colonization of the Oromo; their language and religion were
made illegal, their homeland was expropriated and renamed, and they were forced to live
as slaves on their own land. After the end of the Abyssinian colonial era, historic
discrimination was institutionalized into the new Ethiopian state form through the
politicization of identities. Ethnic identities become political identities when cultural
traits are used by the state as criteria for a differential allocation of rights. This thesis
studies how the identity of the Oromo people (Oromumma) has been shaped over time by
economic, political, and cultural dynamics of oppression and resistance, and how it has
developed among Oromo in the diaspora. Field observations in Ethiopia and interviews
of Oromo immigrants in the U.S. are the basis for the study. This thesis is a unique
contribution to research of marginalized Indigenous populations living under a settler
colonial state in that it examines the unusual case where both the oppressor and oppressed
populations are African. It also makes a contribution to the literature understanding the
politicization of Oromumma in Ethiopia and across the diaspora.

i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am endlessly grateful for maatii koo, hiriyoota koo, baratoota koo, barsiisoota
koo, fi garaa koo: Abera, Abiyot, Abrish, Ahmed, Badhaassaa, Barbara, Bona, Dan,
Dereje, Dinqo, Emily, Ermiyas, Gudeta, Jay, Makiya, Mamitu, Nejat, Nebu, Nihaal,
Roza, Sa’ada, and Senna. Ani kanan bilisoomuu gaafa Oromiyaan bilisoomte qofaa dha.
Without the guidance, wisdom, and support of José, Dan, and Grant, this project would
have taken another five years, at least. Baay’ee isin galateefadha. Thank you.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………….………….………….…. i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…….………….………….………….………….…………....ii
LIST OF TABLES…….………….………….………….………….….…….…………...iv
LIST OF FIGURES…….………….………….………….………….….…….…………..v
GLOSSARY…….………….………….………….………….….…….………………....vi
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………….……1
CHAPTER II: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK……………………………………..… 14
CHAPTER III: METHODS..…………………………………………………………….41
CHAPTER IV: POLITICIZATION OF OROMUMMA OVER TIME……………...….55
CHAPTER V: KEY THEMES AND FINDINGS ………………………………………95
CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION……………………………........126
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………….…………...137
APPENDIX A: NAMES………………………………………………….….….……...145
APPENDIX B: MAPS………………………………………………….….….…….….146
APPENDIX C: METHODS………………………………………………….….….…..150

iii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 3…….………….….…….………….….…….………….….…….……………… 49

iv

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1…….………….….…….………….….…….………….….…….………….. 12
Figure 1.2…….………….….…….………….….…….………….….…….…………. 13
Figure 2…….………….….…….………….….…….………….….…….……………. 17
Figure 5.1…….………….….…….………….….…….………….….…….…………. 102
Figure 5.2…….………….….…….………….….…….………….….…….………….. 114
Figure 5.3…….………….….…….………….….…….………….….…….………….. 114
Figure 5.4…….………….….…….………….….…….………….….…….………….. 123
Figure 5.5…….………….….…….………….….…….………….….…….…………. 124
Figure 6.1…….………….….…….………….….…….………….….…….…………. 129
Figure 6.2…….………….….…….………….….…….………….….…….…………. 133

v

GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Abyssinia, or the Abyssinian Empire: Ethiopia’s former name
Dergue: the fascist regime that ruled from 1974 until 1991
EPRDF: Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
FDRE: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the state’s current, formal name
Finfinnee: the original Afan Oromo name for the capital city, Addis Ababa
MTSHA: Macha Tulama Self-Help Association
Nafxanya-Gabbar System: feudal land and labor system. Nafxanya is the landlord and the
Gabbar is the serf, or slave.
OLF: Oromo Liberation Front
TGE: Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF: Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front
WOC: Western Oromo Confederation

vi

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Re/ Locating the Bones of the Oromo
Relationships between the Oromo people of the Horn of Africa and the leaders of
the empires, kingdoms, and post-colonial states who have sought to rule them over the
past two centuries have been characterized by violence. The Oromo people, from the
beginning of their cultural consciousness, practiced a land-based religion and were
governed using a democratic system of rule called the Gadaa. The rise of the Abyssinian
Empire, the predecessor to the Ethiopian state, led to unrelenting violence against the
Oromo since their colonization in the late 1880s. Despite this violence, Oromo culture
and Oromo people have continued to survive, demonstrating an extraordinary resilience.
In the last few years of the Oromo protest movement a slogan was created, a way
of expressing generations of frustrations, trauma, and death: “Our land is our bones, we
won’t be dislocated.” This phrase responds to the Oromo experience of erasure,
marginalization, and discriminatory political policies, an experience that has been ignored
for too long. Re/locating the bones of the Oromo can be understood as an attempt to
address this violence while also working to dismantle the intersecting forms of political
oppression that made dislocation possible. The state of Ethiopia was founded in part on
the stolen land of the Oromo people, and governed using manipulation and violence; this
continues to impact Oromo life today. Fully understanding the history behind Oromo and
Ethiopian relationships means first making sense of the Oromo “bones,” and the
dislocations that still take place on their homeland.
Some scholars trace the etymology of Gadaa, the name of the system of
democratic governance historically used by the Oromo people of the Horn of Africa, to
1

the Afan Oromo word gaddisuu; to shelter, shade, or protect from the sun. This
protection kept Oromo society functioning peacefully for generations, and covered a land
space that reached across and into Kenya, South Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and vast areas
of Ethiopia. When faced with the well-armed attacks of the Abyssinian empire, however,
this centuries old practice was nearly made extinct. After state consolidation in the 1890s,
the Abyssinians’ physical attacks were re-created as economic practices, legal systems,
and cultural exclusion. The free land of Oromiya and the culture that had thrived there is
visible now only in pockets and pieces, a skeletal form of her former glory.
This colonizing force caused the expulsion and creation of a vibrant Oromo
diaspora, one that remains in conversation with this trauma, asking the same questions:
Does the forced dislocation from the homeland change the way one attaches to it? In a
market-driven, neoliberal world, where the fields the ancestors sang through are plowed
for luxury condos, what does “Mother” Oromiya say, how can she respond? Does her
voice, and the voice of the diaspora, and the stories told of this shared history hinder
progress and sow divisiveness, preventing the actualization of some elusive ultra-modern
Ethiopia? How has the act of speaking, believing, living, and remembering Oromumma
become an international political project, and how does this resistance, once awakened,
work in dialect with the violences that silence, spread ignorance and death, that would
have one forget? What can be done with the bones of the Oromo, with the remnants of a
former freedom?
This thesis project, with these questions in mind, intends to understand most
centrally how the Oromo people experience and define their lives within and despite the
political violence of the post-colonial nation-state of Ethiopia. Understanding this
2

experience necessitates deconstructing the economic, political, and cultural tools
employed by the state, as well as the way the Oromo people resist and counteract these
forces, continuing to fight for liberation. These domains, and the technologies of
oppression and resistance embedded within them, serve as the analytical framework for
this paper. They are also key mechanisms for identifying changes in identity and group
relations since the end of the colonial era. Given this framework, and the underlying
issues, this research project has aimed to answer the following questions:
1. What factors most strongly shaped historical Oromumma, Oromo cultural
identity?
2. What factors have most influenced Oromumma in the Oromo diaspora?

Background Information
For the purpose of this research, it is necessary to make clear the distinctions
between Oromo, Abyssinian, Ethiopian, Amharan, Tigrayan, and Habesha as groups of
people and legal identities. These distinctions are discussed more extensively in their
historical context later. Oromo people, the focus of this project, are an ethnic group
whose indigenous homeland, Oromiya, makes up the largest regional state in modern
Ethiopia. Historic Oromiya, including the pastoralist lands along the Southeastern border,
stretched even further. Oromo people speak Afan Oromo, which translates as the mouth
and language of the Oromo, informally called Oromiffa. Abyssinia and the Abyssinian
Empire was the historic kingdom of Northern Ethiopia, and the name used during the
consolidation of the settler colony. This empire combined the historic kingdoms of Shoa,
Axum, and others. During the reign of Haile Selassie, from 1931-1974, the nation’s name
3

was changed to Ethiopia (Reid 2011:136). There is much debate about the origins of
this name; some connect both Abyssinia and Ethiopia to biblical references, or Greek
mythology, but there is not a clear consensus (Hussein and Ademo 2016; Yates 2016).
Amhara is the name of the region and people of northern Ethiopia who have
generally had the most access to state power and governance, and whose historic rulers
were responsible for the consolidation of Ethiopia (Michael 2008). The Amhara are
primarily Orthodox Christian, and were historically renowned for the might of the Shoa
province and dynasty. The Amhara language, Amharic, is the national language of
Ethiopia. It, along with Tigrigna, is in the same language family as Ge’ez, the language
the bible was written in (Bulcha 1997). Tigray refers to both a region in Ethiopia and an
ethnicity of peoples whose homeland includes parts of Ethiopia and Eritrea. These people
speak Tigrigna, as do some non-Tigrayan Eritreans. In ancient history they were notable
for the Axum Empire, as well as their Christianity (Orlowska 2013:309). Tigrayan people
were major forces both in attempting to overthrow Haile Selassie in 1960, and in the
downfall of the Dergue, the fascist regime, in 1991. Since state re-formation in the early
1990s they have seized the majority of state power and have seen hyper-development in
their region, compared to the mismanagement of aid and resources across the rest of the
country (Gudina 1997; Zegeye 2017). Habesha as an identity marker includes both of
these peoples, as well as other ethnic groups from Eritrea.
More specifically, Habesha identity typically refers to Orthodox Christian
speakers of Semitic languages descended from Ge’ez and living in the Horn of Africa.
Some southern peoples of Ethiopia claim this identity marker, particularly those who
have converted to Orthodox Christianity or adopted the national language as their mother
4

tongue. These more nationalistic Ethiopians sometimes take these steps in order to
increase their access to state power, both in the Menelik era and into the current day.
There are also many Ethiopians who were forcibly Habeshized or Amharized under the
law of Haile Selassie. Habeshization or Amharization is most strongly characterized by
the adoption of Orthodox Christianity and the use of Semitic languages, particularly
Amharic and Tigrigna (Markakis 1989; Bulcha 1997; Hassen 2002; Gebrewold 2009).
Individuals who convert to Orthodox Christianity, like other major religions, will change
their names or name their children with Habesha or Christian names. However, there is
also a history of Oromo military leaders and politicians who changed their names in order
to further their careers, such as Tadesse Biru (Keller 1995:627). All Amhara and
Tigrayan people are Habesha, and we can understand the Abyssinian Empire as a
Habesha empire. Even today there are legal and cultural pressures that constrain
expressions of Oromo identity such as the perpetuation of Orthodox Christianity as a
national religion. While individually these religious and linguistic characteristics seem
fairly innocuous, it is the way they have been used that threatens Oromo survival in the
Ethiopian state, as this thesis project details at length. Understanding Amhara, Tigrayan,
and Habesha dominance throughout history necessitates unpacking the unifying traits and
qualities that connected these empires, most notably the particular brand of nationalistic
Orthodox Christianity that motivated and justified their violence.
A belief in the superior nature of Orthodox Christianity was a driving force
behind Abyssinian practices of colonization during the late 1880s, including the state’s
active role in the slave market, which were partially justified by their views on nonChristians (Tolossa 1997; Jalata 2009; Hassen 2012). As a form of religious nationalism,
5

this ideological underpinning used religion to justify the creation of a new nation, often
through violent means. Habesha people also believed themselves to be more akin to
“civilized Caucasian,” while the southerners were “primitive Blacks” (Yates 2013:86).
The Abyssinians considered the groups of people southern to them, the majority of who
practiced land-based or pagan religions at the time of colonization, to be immoral savages
(Hassen 2012:21). Orthodox Christianity was one of the only pathways to power for an
Oromo, or other Southerner. Promoting themselves as an island of Christianity within the
growing threat of Islam was a tactical and rhetorical strategy employed successfully by
the Abyssinian Empire throughout the reign of Haile Selassie in the mid-1900s, as well as
the Axumite and Shoan kingdoms before it (Jalata 2009). This increased their
international access and encouraged closer relations with Christian nations and former
empires, including support from the British and French during conflicts along each of
their borders (Jalata 2009:192; Reid 2011:141). Furthermore, cultural symbols like the
“romantic image” of Queen of Sheba, and the fair skinned and European-adjacent
Ethiopians would remain the model for generations to come (Tibebu 1996:417).

Overview of Ethiopia-Oromo Relations
As a post-empire, Ethiopia has consistently failed to treat the Oromo people with
respect and dignity. The Abyssinian model for state development did not leave room for
alternative epistemologies, lifeways, or societies. The Oromo traditionally practiced a
land-based religion called Waaqeeffanna, were governed by the Gadaa ruling system, and
communicated using the language Afan Oromo (Knutsson 1963; Keller 1995). The rise
of the Abyssinian Empire challenged each of these core facets of Oromo life, including
6

their right to the land itself. By the height of Emperor Haile Selassie’s rule in the 1950s,
the Oromo had been colonized into the Ethiopian state, and their religion, language,
freedom, and cultural practices had all been suppressed or outlawed. This time period,
from the late 1880s until state consolidation, is best described as colonization and the
creation of a settler colony. The colonizing tactics of the Emperors are discussed at length
in Chapter IV. Settler colonialism differs from other forms of colonialism in that it is
driven by the “pursuit of land, not just labor or resources,” and it leads to the creation of a
“persistent societal structure” and the “reconfiguring of Indigenous land into settler
property” (Rowe and Tuck 2017:4). The creation of Ethiopia, and particularly its
treatment of Indigenous peoples, bears many similarities to that of the United States and
other settler colonies.
Historically, Emperor Selassie engaged in systematic oppression against the
Oromo, justified by the promotion of a new Habesha nationalism and a citizenry of
Amharic-speaking Orthodox Christians (Gebissa 2002; Mains 2004). Under his rule
Ethiopian geography was rewritten and reshaped to fit a settler state model (Hassen
2002). The Dergue, a fascist regime whose rule is described as the “Red Terror,”
overthrew the Emperor in 1974 and began a period of extreme nation-wide repression
(Joireman 1997). This authoritarian rule led to the growth of ethnic-based revolutionary
liberation fronts, the most prominent of which, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front,
was given primary credit for overthrowing the Dergue in 1991 (Tolossa 1997; Jalata
2003). After a brief transition period, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic
Front came to power in 1994, describing itself as a coalition government that would
break with past discriminations and reform the Ethiopian state under an ethnic federal
7

system. Each ethnic group was proclaimed to have equal rights to free speech, cultural
practices, and (equal) representation in government, and the country was divided into
regions and city-states based on historic ethnic territories (Yusuf 2009). Though
promising in theory, this system in many ways served to enforce historic inequities.
Throughout each regime, the governing tactics of the Ethiopian state have been
primarily responsible for the growth and evolution of a vocal Oromo diaspora. While
state violence, ethnic conflicts along the borders, and natural disasters such as drought
have all contributed to upsurges and growth in the Ethiopian refugee population, the
unique tactics used in each era have increased the number of exiles. Menelik’s
prominence in the slave market was directly responsible for the first written records of
the Oromo people living outside of Ethiopia, liberated and living in Europe in the late
19th century (Edwards 1982; Sibilu and Barnes 2015). Emperor Selassie’s targeting of
Oromo culture strengthened these communities, who began to spread the language and
voice of the Oromo internationally (Keller 1995). While the Dergue’s attacks on
intellectuals had an immediate impact on the Oromo people nationally, they also led to a
flourishing of Oromo culture overseas, as college students and professionals fled (Ruda
1993). In addition, the religious aspects of Oromumma, and the intimacy with which the
Oromo people view their homeland, referring to Oromiya as Haadhi, or mother, made
their forced entry into the diaspora more violent. Leaving behind family, tradition, and
society further exacerbates this separation. Oromumma as a belief system sees attacks
against the land as attacks against its own national body (Ruda 1993). This way of
interacting with the world has remained influential despite religious conversion; Oromos
maintain a deep and vocal intimacy with their homeland. The response to this violence
8

has thus far largely resulted in a diaspora whose level of political activity is reflexive of
cultural identity, as Oromos are actively engaged with and haunted by the home they left
(Matsuoka and Sorenson 2001).
According to a 2007 census report, over 33% of the current Ethiopian population
identifies as Oromo, and their homeland is the largest of the regional states (Central
Statistical Agency 2007). Some scholars have suggested that the Ethiopian government’s
history of selective reporting may mean that the actual numbers are in fact much higher
(Bulcha 2002; Zahorik 2011; Jalata 2015). There is also little motivation for careful work
or accountability in these government positions. Government officials who are placed in
Oromiya are not trained on language or culture, and typically use these stations as a way
to gain higher status as a politician (Ruda 1993:249; personal observation).
In the diaspora, identifying and mapping Oromo populations requires overcoming
a number of obstacles. Certain political and social structures make the identification of
Oromo populations difficult, as attempted in the work of Gow 2001 and Virtanen 2009.
The way incoming states classify migrants, based on nationality rather than ethnicity, is
one major challenge (Deffa 2016:354). Bulcha makes the claim that over 500,000
Oromos fled Ethiopia during the Dergue regime, from 1974-1991, but has no clear
estimate for the years following (2002:16). It has been suggested that the EPRDF has led
to displacement and forced migration of Oromo people across the Horn of Africa and
beyond, but the focus has been on the experience of specific groups, rather than the total
population size (Hassen 2002; Feyissa and Lawrence 2014). There are some identifiable
Oromo diaspora populations in the United States, but they also tend to correspond with
diaspora groups from other Horn countries such as Eritrea and Somalia (Deffa 2016;
9

Dugo 2016). Even with the lack of reliable data, what is known of the lived reality of
the Oromo and their historic exclusion from power is troubling.
The Ethiopian state has yet to produce a system of governance that is equal, let
alone equitable. Instead, the ruling party won the 2015 election with an astounding 100%
of the vote, members of a minority ethnic group occupy the majority of political and
military leadership positions, and there has been a steady stream of state-sponsored
violence targeting Oromo institutions and people since 2014 (Horne 2015; Africa
Research Bulletin 2016; Gebissa 2017). The violence is in many ways cyclical: the more
Oromo students and civilians are killed, the more the people protest, and each wave of
protests brings with it more death. Existing within this system means a constant defense
against these relenting attacks, and pressure on the resiliency of Oromumma, or Oromoness. It has also had an influence on the size and shape of the Oromo diaspora, evidenced
by their growing international voice. The resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam
Desalegn in early 2018, and the rise to power of Dr. Abiy Ahmed, an ethnic Oromo,
appeared to be the turning point in Ethiopia-Oromo relations. The symbolism itself has
been widely discussed, similar to the impact of the election of Barack Obama in 2008
relations (Mohammed, Lemma, Giorgis, Nega, Shide 2018). Not all Oromos are
impressed by his heritage, though, and it will be decisions such as the scheduling of the
coming elections and census, his management of the increasing numbers of Internally
Displaced Peoples, and other challenges that truly determine his legacy in Oromiya.
Despite the potential power of Dr. Abiy, as he is affectionately known, a more thorough
elucidation of the ways identity has been politicized for Ethiopian people, both
domestically and within the diaspora, is necessary to make solid claims about his impact.
10

Furthermore, fully conceptualizing the condition of Oromumma within this system is
key to resisting and repairing historical damage.
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Figure 1.1: Ethiopia Administrative Map 2017 Map has been rotated 90 degrees counterclockwise for
better visibility. Oromia is indicated in a yellow-green color.
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CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Politicization of Identity as a Tool for Oppression and Resistance
In the process of state formation after colonialism, indigenous, enslaved, and
other marginalized peoples were forcibly integrated into the new national law and order.
In order to understand the way group identities are altered in post-colonial states, this
section will explicate an analytical framework based on the concept of political identities,
as drawn from the works of Mamdani. In nation states that emerged from the aftermath of
colonial empires, minority groups typically maintained systems of oppression and
secured their power through the legal subjugation of other peoples (Mamdani 1996:73).
This type of reform incorporated communities and ethnic groups into the state and
reproduced their identities along the lines of a “state-enforced customary order,”
transforming them from cultural to political groups (Mamdani 1996:17). The Oromo
people share a common language, set of sacred meanings, and historical inheritance.
Mamdani calls this their cultural identity. After their colonization by the Abyssinian
Empire, the Oromo were subject to legalized oppression that systematically targeted their
way of life, transforming Oromo into a political identity. Restated, although Afan
Oromo-speaking practitioners of Waaqeeffanna are culturally Oromo, the nature of their
relationship with the Ethiopian state determines whether they are politically Oromo.
Oromo people living in the Ethiopian state function under an ethnic federal system in
which their access to political power and rights is filtered through their ethnic identity;
they are always politically Oromo. Mamdani describes this quality as the “resolve to
forge a common future under a single political roof” (2001b:661). This “roof” is the
shared identity under which people connect, organize, and resist. For members of the
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diaspora, their relationship to the political project of the Oromo is altered and
influenced by their relationship to their new nation, and its own political constructs.
Political identities that emerged in the post-colonial transition are still characterized by
their position in what Byrd calls the “transit of empire” (2011).
Byrd uses the empire to describe the way colonial projects and systems “brought
the world, its peoples, and their own structures of power and hegemony to indigenous
lands” causing damage that has remained long colonialism’s formal end (2011:xxvi).
Analyzing the indigenous experience through the lens of the “transit of empire” is a way
of acknowledging that there is a “difference between [a culture that is] recovered and
never having lost in the first place” (Byrd 2011:xi). Identifying political identities that
have emerged out of the transit of empire is a way of reading and interpreting the logics
of colonialism through their continuing cultural, intellectual, and political harm. Similar
to Mamdani, Byrd describes the way that politicization delineates subjected categories of
people, forcing them to inhabit a marginalized legal space that secures minority
dominance “through time, property, and notions of self” (2011:xxiii). In Ethiopia, the
ethnic federalist system has worked to dichotomize, restrict, or falsely conflate groups
into stagnant categories. As a settler colony, Ethiopia has built discrimination into the
foundation of its state and refused to reconcile its historic violence.
An analysis that uses the transit of empire to guide understandings of
politicization in the post-colonial era thus emphasizes to the imbrication of colonial
constructs into current forms of governance. It does not let the post- signify an ending;
rather it refers to what paperson describes as the post+colonial, recognizing that
“colonization is not over… yet we act, dream, and live in ways that are not limited to its
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horizons” (2010:8). paperson further notes that the use of the post+colonial is part of a
project of recovering and uncovering the body of the marginalized homeland “within,
despite, and because of the colonial exercise” (2010:7). Overall, I understand the process
of politicization to be a system that maintains minority power and transits the empire into
the post-colony. For the Oromo, politicization has led to disparate shares of power,
increased tension with groups like the Somali with whom they share a number of cultural
commonalities, and legally justified discrimination.

Politicization as a means of analysis
Given the extreme potential for political violence in post-colonial nations, as is
true of the Oromo context, I develop a framework that seeks to understand the way
institutions and state bodies oppressively politicize identities, and simultaneously how
oppressed or marginalized peoples can reclaim or revitalize their group identity as a form
of political resistance. I understand the political tactics employed by the Ethiopian state to
be an oppressive force, working dialectically with the forces of resistance, political acts
through which groups like the Oromo seek to reclaim sovereignty and work towards
justice. The model also follows the work of Iris Marion Young and her “five faces of
oppression,” a concept meant to elucidate the multidimensional way that oppression
attacks marginalized peoples (2011). The final framework used here goes beyond Young
to incorporate more explicitly global (Mbembé 2003) and anticolonial (Fanon 1986;
Vizenor 2009) literature, as well as expanding on some of the Marxist (Wright 1997)
concepts used by Young.
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The thick center line in Figure 2 below represents the division between
oppression and resistance. The parts of this model that represent the domains where
tactics of oppression and resistance play out are noted in bold italic text. The terms that
are italicized represent the motivating ideologies that characterize each of the subsequent
actions. Although there are many theoretical contributions to this model and the terms
used, discussed at length below, the model itself and the connections between these
theories represent my unique contribution.

Figure 2: Analytical Model
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Motivating Ideologies
As stated earlier, a group whose potential for existence has been restrictively
shaped by the state becomes politicized (Mamdani 2001a). Political resistance takes place
when oppressed groups work against oppressive forces to revive, reclaim, and deny the
power of their marginalization. A reclaimed identity and resistance movement uses a
praxis of healing to create a reconstructed national body or reimagined sovereignty that is
inclusive of their lived experiences and denounces systematic segregation and
oppression. This reclaiming builds the base for an opposition to the ideology of violence
that characterizes both colonial and post-colonial systems. These motivating ideologies
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are what normalize, support, or legitimize the actions of oppressive and resistancebased movements, respectively.

Violence
The key motivating ideology of an oppressive political force is that of violence.
An ideology of violence differs from violence in practice in that the ultimate goal of the
former in any relationship is destruction and domination. Blackhawk describes violence
as both subject and method, noting that violence and relations to violence had a major
impact on the history of Native peoples (2006:7). It is also important to note that not all
acts of violence entail an ideology of violence, as is the case in violent acts of self
defense borne of desperation, as the slave killing their master. An ideology of violence is
necessary for the implementation of an oppressive regime, and thus it was violence which
overwhelmingly defined colonial and indigenous relationships, wedding the groups
together through this mutilation (Blackhawk 2006). By inflicting extreme violences, the
colonial forces themselves were altered, demarcated by this violent trait. Blackhawk
notes that “one of the most lasting legacies of conquest” is the way in which it has
“erased violence and colonialism from discussions” about the status of modern nation
states (2006:13). This absence of critical analysis of legacies of historical violence in
post-colonial countries is in many ways a consequence of its overwhelming presence;
violence played a part in determining each aspect of colonial and post-colonial relations,
and thus identifying its role in each instance can be challenging. Violent ideologies see
erasure and destruction as the only option through which to accomplish their ends.
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Sarah Deer, in writing about the rape of indigenous bodies, subjects, and lives,
notes that both rape and colonial violence “share a common history and language of
dehumanization, power, dominance, and conquest” (2015:51). This “language” is a way
of justifying harm by reframing horrific acts as a necessary part of expanding and
achieving the aims of the empire. Furthermore, the extensive reach of this violence, and
the seeds of shame and fear that it sows, become embedded into norms of behavior,
traumatizing community psyches over the course of generations (2015:21). Violence as
an ideological underpinning to a set of practices can “manifest as systemic yet invisible
structures that accomplish the trauma of violence on a large scale” (2015:xvii). These
definitions work together to create an ideology of violence that characterizes each aspect
of oppressive politicization.

Healing
As puzzling, ubiquitous, and permeating as violence is, healing can be even more
difficult to explicate. Accountability, reconciliation, and moves towards decolonization
have received less study than violence itself, and too often liberation attempts simply
replace oppressive ideologies with alternative forms of violence. In the Ethiopian context,
Eritrea is the most salient example; long after Eritrea’s expulsion of invading Ethiopian
forces in 2000, the people still suffer with fear, starvation, and oppression (Reid 2011;
Weldemichael 2013). However, in order to truly counteract and resist structures of
violence, epistemologies of healing must be given this same careful analysis and
prioritization. Smith describes the process of resistance as a “recovery of ourselves,”
noting that by taking back the institutions through which imperialism is implemented and
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made possible, we contribute to the struggle for self-determination (paraphrased
2012:8). I build my epistemology of healing through a combination of several scholars
who have lived under and fought against colonial empires and post-colonial settler states
across the globe.
Throughout her description of the decolonizing project, Smith identifies societal
repair as a central priority; recovery and healing are both key parts of the indigenous
research model she constructs (2012:121). Several of Smith’s recommendations are
particularly salient here as part of the act of healing: the need for claiming and reclaiming
indigenous culture, reframing indigenous narratives, and re-membering (2012:144-155).
The latter term warrants some unpacking, as it is a unique way of understanding the
healing potential of undoing the settler colonial project. Re-membering is both a reliving
and strengthening of community memories, and a way of “connecting bodies with place
and experience” (Smith 2012:147). This type of collective and intentional remembering
acts to legitimize collective group trauma, in order that it may be processed and dealt
with. Byrd describes this process as mnemonic methods, placing disparate views into
conversation with the goal of strengthening community knowledge (2011:xii). Healing
involves acknowledging the real historic relationships of violence between peoples, then
working to address and redress these specific harms.
Understanding healing as a response and challenge to forces of oppressive
violence is further developed by the work of Saidiya Hartman and her discussion of the
resistance politics of the enslaved. Hartman notes that no strategies of domination are
able to “exhaust all possibilities of intervention, resistance, or transformation” despite
their multilateral tactics (1997:56). Although violence seeks to deny it, practices of
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healing have always existed, unconquerable. Thus our exploration of healing resistance
is “less concerned with issues of heroic action… than with the inadvertent, contingent,
and submerged forms of contestation” that make up everyday life (1997:62). Restated,
healing and resisting extreme oppressive violence is more than enacting grand legal
policies and state-defined modes of justice; instead it is with the multitude of small
resistances that we can best create decolonizing strategies. Fugitive justice as a form of
healing exists “between the necessity of legal remedy and the impossibility of redress” by
the state (Best and Hartman 2005:3). In the “interval between the destruction of the old
world and the awaited hour of deliverance,” fugitive justice allows for the processing of
grief and grievance and the denial of violence (Best and Hartman 2005:3). While
understanding that formal apologies and reparations may never come, fugitive justice is
used as a way to heal, and to reframe the possibilities of what healing is. As forces that
denies state power without being of the state, fugitive justice, resistance, and the practices
of healing are politicizing mechanisms with the most potential to decolonize the
oppressive state.

Domains of Oppression/Resistance
Economic
Economic oppression turns the practices, homelands, and bodies of a nation into
instruments that generate wealth for the state, and allow dominant groups to secure their
interests through state systems. A group whose identity is being politicized in an
oppressive direction will face exploitation and marginalization justified by their group
traits, practices, or worldviews. Theorist Erik Olin Wright separates exploitation and
21

what I name marginalization by explicating the logic of two different abhorrent
ideologies: the only good X (ethnic group) is a dead X, and the only good worker is a
dead worker. The logic of the first statement, when applied to a class or political group,
represents a system where the elites have no use for the subordinate people; they are sent
to the margins of power, and thus lose economic access. Wright goes further to argue that
marginalization as a practice suggests that “the oppressors would be happy if the
oppressed simply disappeared” (1997:11). Iris Marion Young sees marginalization as
building the “growing class of people permanently confined to lives of social
marginality,” because the “system of labor cannot or will not use” them (2011:49).
The example of the worker does not fit the logic of marginalization, but shares its
violence. An exploitative reorganization would likely note that “the only good worker is
an obedient and conscientious worker” who can be oppressed in the hierarchy of the
market to feed the elites (Wright 1997:11). Wright understands an exploitative system as
one in which the material welfare of the elite class “causally depends on the material
deprivation” of the marginalized, relations are demarcated by “the asymmetrical
exclusion of the exploited,” and the mechanism by which this is accomplished involves
“appropriation of the fruits of labor” (1997:10). Young’s analysis follows this same line
of thinking, but adds that exploitation “enacts a structural relation between social groups”
within which the results of effort are appropriated to reproduce systems of inequality
(2011:46). In both marginalizing and exploitative economic practices there is a
systematic oppression of group agency, an oppressive politicization. Although
exploitation is built on the appropriation and dispossession of materials, marginalized
peoples are typically left out of the equation entirely. In the case of autochthonous or
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Indigenous nations, their land is considered inherently dispossessed because they are so
marginal as to not exist in discourse. This dispossession is often a precursor to the
commodification of Indigenous lands and bodies. For the Oromo, their issues are only
given attention or respect when they are tied into the economic prosperity of the nation; I
understand this devaluing to be a form of commodification (used interchangeably here
with commoditization).
Economic oppression was central to the original accomplishments of colonialism
and is still present in the post-colonial state. Therefore, as Fanon notes, in order to
properly decolonize or “disalienate,” we must first recognize the double process of
economic and socially produced inferiorities (1986:13). Resisting economic oppression
means taking actions that undermine neoliberal, commodifying, and extractive state
tactics; successful resistance is thus a way for exploited and marginalized peoples to
organize both against and outside the formal labor market. Harvey notes that a
“disposable workforce inevitably turns to other institutional forms through which to
construct social solidarities” when the marginalization of the market-based economy
becomes untenable (2005:171). Within the oppressive system, social relationships and
identities are defined by their ability to contribute to the market and their social class;
they are commoditized. Thus, these “other forms” are the space where decolonization and
decommodification take place, and “fill the void left behind as… other institutional forms
are actively dismantled” (Harvey 2005:171).
Creating strategies that allow for the development of relationships and institutions
outside of the oppressive state system is essential to decommodifying and resisting these
tactics. Under Vail’s definition, decommodification is “any political, social, or cultural
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process that reduces the scope and influence of the market” (2010:313). Understanding
that control over the market is often a tool used to maintain elite power, it is important to
further note that practices of economic resistance may also combine markets with “other
diverse non-market methods of organizing economic activity” in order to mitigate the
harm of economic hierarchies, while taking advantage of any potential benefits (Vail
2010:317). These combinations “fill the void” referenced by Harvey, cited above, in that
they use economic processes to facilitate solidarity and increase social protections
(2005:171).
The Indigenous Oromo homeland was expropriated and turned into coffee
plantations that took advantage of Oromo knowledge and skills for profit, without
returning the benefits of this to Oromo communities; this can be understood as an act of
exploitative commodification (Hassen 2002:21). Thus, decommodification would include
Oromo people taking control of their homeland in a way that sees Oromo land as a vital
part of the community and its life rather than exploiting its profit potential. On a smaller
scale, I personally witnessed Oromo business people who took advantage of the informal
nature of the local economy to set higher prices for those who spoke Amharic instead of
Afan Oromo at the market. These exchanges demonstrate a refusal to let the stateenforced values that have seeped from the market into social life continue to dominate.
These actions are a type of decommodification because they show that the solidarity of
the marginalized many has the potential to interrupt the elite’s control over the market.
While the scope and impact of decommodification can be difficult to track and identify
from the outside, the core ideology of these practices is also seen in more organized
resistance.
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Gene Sharp describes forms of economic resistance at length in his guide to
nonviolent struggle (2013). Some of the forms of economic resistance discussed by Sharp
include boycotts and a variety of strikes that target laws, institutions, and elite classes. He
defines boycotts here as a “refusal to buy, sell, handle, or distribute specific goods and
services” (2013:31). Strikes are similarly “designed to enact pressure” on the oppressive
economic structure, and thus force open the possibility of alternative market forms
(2013:37). Stay-at-home strikes are a particular example of economic noncooperation
that establishes new behaviors, relationships, or policies; if individuals are to be punished
for the act of existence, they will show what their absence means to the economic
function of a country (2013:43). This tactic was used successfully by the Oromo people
on several occasions. Refusing to cooperate with the boundaries of market relationships
allows for marginalized people to decommodify the social structures created by greedy
states.

Political
A group whose identity is being politicized at the hands of the state faces legal,
systematic, and institutional oppression. During state creation after colonialism’s end,
determinations of citizenship, subjecthood, and the right to exist in certain land spaces
were highly politicized and often violent processes (Mamdani 1996; Byrd 2011).
Furthermore, by following the aberration that allows oppressive political forces to feel
justified using genocidal ends, one is better able to understand the potential for resistance
against them. Mamdani’s extended analysis of indirect rule provides insight into the more
explicitly legal aspect of political politicization. He notes that the controlling mindset of
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the post-colonial state actor was that “if popular resistance could not be smashed
frontally it would have to be fragmented through reform” (1996:90). This included the
creation of narrowly defined intermediary groups, usually a numerical minority, who
ruled majority populations by using the authority of their hierarchal legal system to
maintain order and retain privileges denied to the majority. Although ultimately
dependent on violence, this type of politicization relied primarily on forms of law that
were presented as integral to the greater goals of the state (Mamdani 2001a:654). Postcolonial states that built themselves on a structure of indirect rule used legal means to
politicize identities and maintain control.
Using the concept of necropolitics, Mbembé describes a state whose violent
ideologies and tactics have led to the employment of a legally sanctioned death sentence
as a means of achieving state ends. States who have necropower (similarly described as
necropolitical regimes or states) can be understood as possessing a monopoly over the
control of life and death, a sort of super-sovereignty that denies the possibility of
corporeal agency. Stated otherwise, there is no guarantee that the life of the marginalized,
of those deemed “Other,” will not end at any moment. Rather, the “perception of the
existence of the Other as an attempt on my life, as a mortal threat or absolute danger
whose biophysical elimination would strengthen my potential to life and security… is one
of the many imaginaries of sovereignty” in a necropowerful state (Mbembé 2003:18).
Understood as a governing tactic, necropolitics are the expression of a state that
has evolved into a terror formation and thus discriminates along the boundaries of who
should live or die (2003:22). This is key to understanding both colonization and postcolonial state building because of the way state and political powers like the law were
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used to justify and actualize mass death. Mbembé uses necropower to refer to “figures
of sovereignty whose central project… [is] the generalized instrumentalization of human
existence and the material destruction of human bodies” (2003:14). In both the
metaphoric/ ideological and the physical/ infrastructural construction of a nation, he
writes the labor and the bodies of the masses are kept under tight control by the ruling
elites. Colonized subjects are “given a status that enshrined their despoilment” (Mbembé
2003:25). In the Ethiopian example, the government’s decisions to enact a “State of
Emergency” in response to nonviolent Oromo protests in 2010s were a way to justify the
terror regime of oppression. Most egregiously in 2016 following the “Irreecha Massacre,”
after dozens of Oromo people were killed by government forces while celebrating a
religious holiday, the government responded by enacting a State of Emergency, shutting
down internet and mobile communications and closing roads. Under the cloak of a legally
and politically legitimate darkness, elite forces were able to use extreme ends to reinstate
order. Activating the necropowerful potential of the state is the whim of the elite and the
constant lurking fear of the marginalized.
Colonial and post-colonial ways of thinking place imaginary restrictions on the
possibilities for resisting these vastly encompassing state structures. However, scholars
like Byrd remind us that sovereignty is “unconquered and unconquerable” (2011:xvi).
Restated, if we take the modern nation state to be the norm, any other organizing political
structure is viewed as “other,” alternative, or secondary. But oppressed and marginalized
people have lived their lives on the “other” side of justice and the law; they function and
operate according to structures that colonial powers have not been able to permeate.
These forms of organization and sovereignty exist outside of the formal state structures,
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in the shadows, the undercommons, and the fourth world (Vizenor 2009; Harney and
Moten 2013; paperson 2017). Understanding sovereignty as a mode of resistance
therefore means keeping in mind the ways that “sovereignty is found… through relation,
kinship, and intimacy” just as much as it is in democratic and legal decisions (Byrd
2011:xvi). Analyzing sovereignty s a means of resistance outside of state structures sheds
light on the potential for organization and transformation outside of the post-colonial
national organization.
Mbembé describes sovereignty as “a two-fold process of self-institution and selflimitation” that eventually demonstrates “society’s capacity for self-creation” (2003:13).
With the ability to institutionalize their chosen mode of organization, a nation is
demonstrating its sovereign status. Taking as a starting point the legitimacy of groups and
nations that do not have statehood, Deer sees sovereignty as a crucial way of addressing
abusive power. They note that sovereignty can take both a political and personal form,
but clarify that in both senses “self-determination necessarily implies the development of
concrete solutions to problems” (2015:xv). This sovereignty is a sovereignty of the soul,
and operates outside of formal state-recognized limits. Furthermore, in creating the “legal
framework of the soul,” Deer explains that the soul can be thought of as the “deep,
fundamental aspects of identity” that are most damaged by state violence (2015:xvi). By
asserting a sovereignty for the soul, oppressed groups subvert nation-state forms to build
a sovereignty that fully addresses the damage of colonial violence. Holistically one can
view resistance sovereignty as a form of self-determination that moves around and
despite neocolonial nation-states. Sovereignty is when a group asserts its voice, and
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demands the legitimization of its right to do so. Organization is evidenced by structures,
gatherings, groups, and more formal non-governmental groups (Deer 2015).

Cultural
Elites in colonial and post-colonial societies manufactured cultural norms and
policies to dominate subordinate populations. Cultural imperialism is one of the more
easily obscured forms of oppression. Whereas the other oppressive forces have fairly
explicit legal or economic impacts, the process of norm creation through which cultural
imperialism is implemented often obfuscates its impact. Young sees cultural imperialism
as a system of norms that render a group’s experience invisible, entrench it with
stereotypes, or relegate it to a position of “Other” within society (2011:56). The standard
of the empire is designed to limit what is right and what is possible in the cultural
domain. Groups that are imperialized by these norms thus face “paradoxical
oppressions;” either they are forgotten entirely, “stamped with an essence” that defines
them as remarkable or deviant, or boxed in by stereotypes that “so permeate the society
that they are not noticed as contestable” (Young 2011:55). These boundaries are placed
on behavior, actions, ways of knowing, worldviews; every aspect of existence. As a form
of oppression, cultural imperialism compounds the other forms and expands their reach.
A useful framework for looking at the Oromo in the context of a racialized settler
state is the concept of “controlling images,” as developed by Collins (2000:69). These
archetypes define the bounds of Black women’s existence in civil society. In the
Ethiopian example, the Habesha as an ideal type left little room for Oromo assertions of
self to be taken as legitimate or respected. The Other-ing project of the empire works
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diligently to push the customs, cultures, and ideologies of indigenous peoples into the
realm of the savage, the outside, and the dangerous. It works with state systems to render
people kill-able, it interacts with economic systems to make identities un-hirable, and it
suppresses tradition from all sides. As Hill Collins notes, “when faced with this structural
injustice… many Black women have insisted on our right to define our own reality,
establish our own identities, and name our history” (2000:72). Without this insistence, the
Other-ing and controlling nature of the colonial settler state would overwhelm authentic
narratives. Further challenging the ability of marginalized people to express their
authentic identity is the state’s imposition of identity formations under the law, such as
with Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system.
Byrd describes how cultural imperialism creates “cultural productions and
political movements” that are born of the “violences and genocides of colonization,” and
bear their wounds (2011:xii). These new identities and ways of knowing thus create new
modes of oppression, and an increasingly marginalized population as a result. This
“cacophony” creates false subjecthoods and roles that permit indigenous experience only
through a corrupted and coopted version, suppressing a priori indigenous existence for an
imperialized norm that can be shuffled back into the cacophony of the neocolony (Byrd
2011:xviii). In a violent political system, this cacophony serves to obscure the original
violence: the creation of the settler colonial state on top of and despite the wishes of the
colonized masses. This cacophony further silences the voices of the Oromo, as their cries
for help are relocated as local, political issues, rather than as a set of holistic violences
against them as a people.
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Resistance to cultural and civil oppression thus takes the form of survivance, a
term created by Gerald Vizenor. Survivance is described in the simplest terms as a hybrid
between survival and resistance; the act of survival itself being a way to challenge the
oppressive forces who continue to try to erase you (2009). bell hooks frames the sharing
of marginalized voices as “an act of resistance” undertaken by “those who understand the
power of voice as gesture of rebellion and resistance” (2015:36). Asserting authentic,
resilient group identity speaks with a “liberatory voice,” a “way of speaking that is no
longer determined by one’s status as object- as oppressed being” and instead counteracts
misappropriation and domination (2015:38). By speaking up and speaking out, denying
attempts to oppress and silence, marginalized people resist and reclaim their culture. The
liberatory potential of the voices of the oppressed is the same radical potential that
Vizenor points to with the term survivance: oppressed and marginalized people who
speak are asserting their right to thrive.
For oppressed people, survivance, once awakened, emerges as an “active, creative
force” that refuses any tendency to sink into “tragic victimry” (Vizenor 2009:24).
Vizenor further notes that “Native survivance is an active sense of presence over absence,
deracination, and oblivion; survivance is the continuance of stories, not a mere reaction”
(2009:85). This latter point is essential to the ance of survivance; without the conscious
decision of the indigenous national body to thrive, there is no potential for life as
resistance. Instead oppression and trauma too often become normalized, a reaction to the
penetrative presence of violent conditions. Vizenor describes “active resistance and
repudiation of dominance” in part as the assertion of indigenous peoples’ authentic
presence in the face of appropriation and silencing (2009:88). Survivance as a way of
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refuting the imperial culture and cacophony of the Ethiopian empire is identifiable
every time Waaqa, the Oromo god, is praised, when the city of Finfinnee is called by her
name, and in each instance that Oromo people continue to exist, despite.

Intersections Between Domains
I have set up an analytical distinction between three domains of politicization of
subordinate identities not to suggest that they act independently of each other. Rather,
forms of oppression often lead to and allow for additional violence. There are a few
institutions and tactics that bear further explanation here for their unique abilities to share
technologies, and the reach of their harm. Most prescient in the modern post-colonial
context is the neoliberal state model, which reimagines social and legal relationships
along the priorities of the markets. I draw my understanding of neoliberalism from the
Southern perspective brought forth by Connell and Dados (2014:124). Neoliberalism can
be understood as a development strategy that reorients the economy to international trade,
uses economic growth as a way to demonstrate state legitimacy, and is characterized by
de-regulation and privatization (Connell and Dados 2014:122). Neoliberal agendas
redesign a society around the needs of the market and elevate market values , and the
interests of those of elites who most benefit, above all others (Connell and Dados
2014:118). Their analysis describes neoliberalism as a “re-weaving of worldwide
economic and social relationships,” within which trade, agriculture, and industry are only
pieces (2014:124). The difference of this “Southern” read on neoliberalism is its
identification of neoliberal thinking as a strategy of oppression used similarly by postempires, rather than limited to Northern post-colonial powers.
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Education as a means of oppression and resistance also serves to confound the
categories above for its direct political, economic, and cultural implications. These
politicizing processes can be found in the subject matter, the perception of education, the
means of testing, and the barriers to access, including cultural, infrastructural, and
physical. Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed provides a model for what an educational
praxis of resistance looks like, and embedded in his argument is the idea that education is
a tool for counteracting ideological and political violence (2000). As a political strategy,
implementing differential access to education has both immediate and long-term impacts
on the resistance potential of marginalized peoples; however, the course content itself
also reflects and reiterates oppressive ideologies in a way that is not always interrogated.
Mamdani provides an example of history classes in post-genocide Rwandan public
schools: “because there is no agreement on what should be taught as history” after the
mass violence, all teaching of the subject had stopped (2001b:267). Mamdani therefore
calls for a process of contextualizing the truth, which can be undertaken only with the
support of a just and equitable historic reconciliation (2001b:268). Understanding
education as a project with serious cultural consequences is key to recognizing its force
as a state power.
As paperson notes, oftentimes the “dislocation of people into subordinated
positions [is] part of the modern school system, rather than an accident of discrimination”
(2010:9). Going further, they explicate the dialectic concepts of “imperial education” and
“colonial schooling;” the former is “training for inclusion into the metropole,” whereas
the latter is merely a “form of management” (2010:24). Inclusion into the metropole,
given that the metropolitan center is one of a market-driven settler state, is an economic
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undertaking, whereas management through education is a more explicitly political aim.
Through these constructs we can see how the educational project and the institutions that
undertake it serve to confound and overlap with economic, political, and cultural forms of
oppression and resistance. For the primary purpose of this research project, education is
understood as a state-implemented project that serves to subordinate or provides
opportunities to organize.
Land confounds the boundaries between the domains of legal, economic, and
cultural politicization. The way land is viewed and interacted with differs dramatically
between peoples, both within and alongside the settler/ native binary. That land should
“produce” at all is the typical imperialist view, whereas many indigenous peoples see the
land as a relative or part of a sacred kinship connection, as is the case with the Oromo
(Ruda 1993). Even before the rise of colonialism, Polanyi notes that “land, the pivotal
element in the feudal order, was the basis” for all other aspects of societal organization
(1944:69). As societies transitioned into colonial and post-colonial models, these
relationships were reframed. Strategic underdevelopment as a concept provides an
example of the manipulative tactics of the settler colonial state in regards to land. Gunder
Frank describes strategic underdevelopment as the intentional distribution or withholding
of resources across the empire (1969:77). These resources include necessary
infrastructure such as roads, schools, and hospitals. By first occupying the land, cutting
off indigenous lifeways and technologies, and then refusing access to modern resources,
settler colonists like the Abyssinians turned the land from kin, to product, to source of
alienation. This is legally justified, economically impactful, and harmful to native peoples
and to a priori culture.
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As a politicizing force, losing access to indigenous land has long-term negative
impacts on communities who for generations struggle to process and comprehend
kinships and tradition within newly enforced colonial boundaries (Byrd 2011). Polanyi
further notes that the moment labor, “the human beings themselves of which every
society consists,” and land, “the natural surroundings in which it exists” are included in
the market mechanism, the very “substance of society itself” has been subordinated to the
laws of the market (1944:71). Land therefore always operates in the liminal space within
and across the domains demarcated above. For the primary purpose of this paper, land
will be understood in the terms by which it has been politicized: as an economic resource
and a political tool. In the Oromo example, the rapid modernization of Addis Ababa and
the way farmers and rural residents have been treated in the process demonstrates the
potential danger of economic politicization. In rural Oromiya, when the Meles Zenawi
government refused to build key infrastructure like schools and hospitals in West
Wollega throughout the 1990s, as punishment for the revolutionary history of the
previous decades, land became a political weapon. In all cases, Oromo land is intertwined
with Oromumma, but in this project it is framed primarily in economic terms.

The Role of Diaspora
A major focus of this work is the politicization of Oromumma, as understood by
Oromo people in the diaspora. In other words, I am seeking to understand how departure
from their homeland has changed the way Oromo people relate to and understand the
conditions of their Oromo-ness. At its core, Oromumma is the cultural inheritance,
lifeways, language, and spirit of the Oromo people, one that was birthed by the Haadha
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(Mother) Oromiya and has survived each attempt against it. Diaspora as a space,
identity, and community complicates this relationship. Although Oromo people in the
diaspora have entered different racialized, classed, and legal subject positions, their
journeys are still very much rooted in the homeland. Within Ethiopia, the Oromo people
remain exploited and disenfranchised. To be Oromo anywhere, to claim Oromo identity
from the myriad identities available (Ethiopian, African, Black), is to connect with the
global struggle for the Oromo, an identity that remains under attack.
Brah notes that the very construct of diaspora, or diaspora space, necessitates the
interlocking of a journey and the “socio-economic, political and cultural conditions [that]
mark the trajectories of these journeys” (1996:182). A diaspora therefore needs to be
understood through the confluence of narratives that the population carries, lives,
produces, and reproduces, as well as the international politics that influence this heritage
(1996:183). As a politicizing process, both the individual’s identity and the way they
interact with their homeland are influential. As an analytical framework, Brah’s
conceptualization of diaspora elucidates the way the a priori and adopted homeland both
carry politicizing forces that bear unpacking (1996:190). While the formation of the
diaspora itself has important consequences on group social power and ways of knowing,
it is also the root of this exodus that influences the nature of their politicization. The
emphasis on what is carried is reminiscent of a concept suggested by Gilroy, that of
rooted routes (1993).
The primary focus for this project is the root, rather than the route: I am looking at
Oromumma in transit, with close attention to where the journey began. The interview
questions probe the way the Ethiopian state has used and manipulated pieces of Oromo
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identity to determine access to power. Conceptualizing this power from the position of
the diaspora also necessitates unpacking the way diaspora as a positionality is a response
to state violence, regardless of the form of transit. Being in the diaspora is a potentially
radical subject position because it contests state power on a number of levels. When
thinking through the way identities are politicized and re-politicized in transit, I find it
useful to compare two extreme Oromo reactions to Ethiopian state violence: the decision
to join the armed liberation struggle, and entering the diaspora. How are both of these
acts of resistance? How do they reflect a shadowy sovereignty made possible only within
conditions of extreme state violence? Both of these actions sever the normative relations
between the people and the state, but those norms are violent, and borne of violence.
Leaving the Oromo homeland, and exiting the city in favor of the alternative sovereignty
of the jungle (where the resistance lives) and its liberatory potential, both demonstrate the
inability for Oromo existence in the settler colonial state; one either functions despite its
wishes, or actively works against it. This exile is thus inherently politicizing; as long as
Oromo people maintain their identity as Oromos, they reimagine the boundaries of
Oromumma and its potential. Gilroy notes that diaspora as a concept has the “ability to
pose the relationship between ethnic sameness and differentiation: a changing same”
(1993:xi). Understanding the changes to identity and the nature of politicization in transit
is best done by following the three domains of oppression presented above.
In the political domain, diaspora as a temporality allows for room and potential to
organize not found in the homeland. Politically, Oromo people find new spaces, systems,
and opportunities to work for change while living in the diaspora (“Angry Ethiopians”
1997; Matsuoaka and Sorenson 2001). These spaces include social groups and societies,
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as much as digital communities (Zahorik 2011). The rise of social media and the
platforms it provides for Oromos with dissenting political beliefs has had a major
influence on the politicization of identity in the diaspora. While Oromo people in the
homeland are restricted in their ability to express, act, organize around, or even hear
beliefs that go against the government, with the punishment being imprisonment or death,
the open internet access of diasporas in the global North gives a voice and political power
to people, often for the first time (Virtanen 2009; Dugo 2016). Practices that demonstrate
the diaspora’s potential to transform the oppressive home state include the lobbying of
prominent officials and embassies in Northern nations (Feyissa and Lawrence 2014). The
voice of the Oromo diaspora is so strong that new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed made
Minnesota a stop on his first U.S. tour. As a part of a collective effort, these actions allow
Oromo people to use their resources as an ethnic group to regain or find a voice for
Oromumma outside of the homeland. This organizing leverages their shared cultural
identity as a way to gain rights and political power against the wishes of the
subordinating Ethiopian state.
Economically and socially-produced inferiorities are intertwined in the colonial
and post-colonial state. Entering the diaspora removes these connections, and shifts the
class position and agency of previously marginalized ethnic peoples like the Oromo
(Yusuf 2009:310). In the diaspora, the strategic and selective attacks that characterize
Ethiopia’s treatment of the Oromo no longer exist; access to goods, services, and
opportunities for Oromos and other Ethiopian ethnic groups in the diaspora is no longer
being determined by their ethnic traits (Sorenson 1996:441; Gibb 2002:56). The
Ethiopian state functions by profiting off the labor and land of the Oromo; Oromo
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identity has been commodified due to the decades-long association between Oromo
land as product, and Oromo people as serfs or slaves. People in the diaspora are no longer
economically punishable by their home state, and instead through actions like sending
remittances become a force of resistance; they are able to use their position outside of the
state to support economic causes and independence (Antwi-Boateng 2011:10). In the
Ethiopian example, this means that Oromo identity in the diaspora is partially
decommodified and transformed. The land issue, the government’s expropriation of
Oromo homeland for private development, has created internal displacement and
marginalization in Oromiya. The definition of marginalization becomes salient here; the
state would prefer if they simply disappeared. By leaving the nation state but maintaining
their Oromumma, Oromo people fight erasure, and simultaneously refuse to be
economically excluded. The diaspora as a space makes this resistance possible.
When removed from Ethiopia’s oppression, Oromo people, who share a common
language and historical inheritance, have the ability to use these shared traits as a way to
increase access, build community, and gain rights. Expressions of Oromo identity in the
diaspora are a way to stay rooted in the homeland while expressing the changes and
evolution caused by the route. As Gilroy notes, identities formed in the diaspora are
“always unfinished, always being remade” (1993:xi). This process of construction speaks
to the way Oromo identity in the diaspora is actively politicized and reclaimed by Oromo
people as a means to counteract historic violence. In the diaspora, survivance is made
tangible; the passport, new address, new citizenship are all proof that you have survived
despite the myriad forces hoping to bury you. The first publications and proclamations of
Oromo pride in the Oromo language, many of which are still available today, were all
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written or disseminated by members of the Oromo diaspora. One of the few heroes in
Oromo folklore was a diasporic figure, Onesimos Nesib, who translated the bible into
Afan Oromo while being trained as a missionary in Sweden; using his exile as a way to
reclaim culture, and the value of the Oromo language as a form of expression (Jalata
2002:137). By succeeding despite Ethiopia’s violence, diasporic conceptualizations of
Oromumma are politicized and activated as a resistance, or at least rebuttal, to Ethiopia’s
state violence.
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CHAPTER III: METHODS
Introduction
This study is guided by two key research questions: 1) What factors most strongly
shaped historical Oromumma, Oromo cultural and political identity? 2) What factors
have most influenced Oromumma in the diaspora? More specifically, this study explores
the politicizing tactics of a post-colonial state, as understood and resisted by members of
the diaspora. Understanding Ethiopia as a violent former empire that has consistently
used ethnic traits to maintain a power hierarchy is a key part of my analytical strategy.
The methodology I use connects each piece of the research project. Following this
chapter will come a historical analysis that serves to answer the first research question.

A Decolonizing Methodology
The methods for this project are grounded in a decolonizing framework.
Decolonization as an aspect of research design and practice prioritizes healing and repair,
and seeks to empower the oppressed. Given violent post-colonial relationships like that of
the Ethiopian state and the Oromo people, the work of rereading, rewriting, and
recentering historical imperial narratives is central to decolonization (Smith 2012). Each
aspect of my research design gives attention to this primary need. Smith identifies
“imperialism, history, writing, and theory” as four often overlooked aspects of the
research process that despite being constantly present in the lives of indigenous peoples
and contributing heavily to the “underlying assumptions, motivations, and values which
inform research practices,” are not often given careful attention (2012:21). In order to
learn how Oromo people, as an indigenous group still living the effects of the Abyssinian
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empire, understand their politicization, this methodology continually probed for the
traces that the transit of empire left behind. The politicization of the Oromo was initiated
by the empire, and thus unpacking the empire’s lingering presence, and the way it has
controlled the narrative, is key to a decolonial project. Addressing the imperial tendencies
of both the state and its cultural elites, critically examining what history was written and
by whom, and theorizing a resistance project that emerges from Oromo epistemologies
are all features of this research project. These practices also demonstrate the decolonial
potential of this project, and the topic itself.

Data and Analysis
This study uses a qualitative approach that focuses on the participants’ lived
understandings, experiences, and perspectives. Three years of informal participant
observation, from July 2014− September 2017, laid the groundwork for the datacollection phase. Data analyzed were of two types: secondary sources (academic
literature and research reports), and semi-structured interviews. I conducted interviews
with individuals who identified as Oromo and lived in the diaspora. I sought triangulation
as much as possible, that is, to identify confirmation across the different data types and
the informal participant observation.

The Researcher’s Positionality — Advantages and Liabilities
The three years I spent in Oromiya and my linguistic skills were a significant part
of the interview process — they allowed me to build trust, rapport, and legitimacy with
my interview participants. I lived for two years in a rural town in the Illubabor Zone,
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working full time as a 9th grade English teacher. My community was majority Muslim
Oromo, with large pockets of Protestants, especially in the town center. This ethnic
division was also reflective of my neighbors, coworkers, and close friends during this
time. After these two years (2014-2016), I moved to Jimma Town and worked as a
Regional Leader for Peace Corps. In this role I travelled extensively throughout
Southwestern Oromiya, and Western SNNPR. There were myriad occasions where I was
the first, or only non-Ethiopian an individual had ever met. My Ethiopian coworkers were
primarily Oromo, from both West and Eastern Oromiya. As such my experiences in
Oromiya were diverse, and deeply immersive. Also worth noting is that many of my
friends and colleagues in Ethiopia were generally aware of my research as it was taking
shape, though I explained it more broadly as an exploration of Oromo histories and
experiences. I had extensive conversations on many of these same topics with friends and
colleagues, in part because this same period, in particular the summer and fall of 2016,
was marked by intensifying state violence and repression of the Oromo. For example, my
organization directed us to cancel a regional summer camp in 2016 because travel across
rural Oromiya was considered too unsafe. As was the case with my research participants,
my Oromo friends in Ethiopia spoke with surprising bluntness and candor when
discussing their relationship with the Ethiopian state.
Despite the strengths of my research methodology, there are limitations that
should be discussed. One limitation of my research is a potential for bias due to the
amount of time I spent in the field and the high amount of involvement I have in Oromo
issues. This bias is a limit to the study’s validity because another researcher would not
likely share these same experiences or develop the same perspective. However, my larger
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research project is grounded in a rigorous theoretical framework. By understanding my
specific focus within a larger global context and using this framework as a tool, I have
been able to legitimize my claims. Another limitation, arguably, is that although my
sample size is fairly representative of the Oromo population, a larger sample size would
strengthen the case. This point has some merit, but I believe that using the literature as a
foundation of the piece makes up for this slight limitation. The depth of my observation
and the time I’ve spent in the field also compensates partly for the sample size.

Data Collection
Informal participant observation
I spent three years living and working in Western Oromiya, from 2014-2017: two
years in Illubabor Zone and one year in the Jimma Zone. During this time I also traveled
extensively throughout Bedele and Showa Zones, made nearly two dozen trips to the
capital city of Addis Ababa, including an extended two-week period during the State of
Emergency in 2016, and travelled briefly to major cities around the country. Throughout
this time I kept note of actions and interactions that related to Oromo identity in public.
These were not formal field notes, but I did keep a written record of some observations,
which I recorded in private. This includes the use of Afan Oromo, Oromo signs and
symbols, or anti-Oromo sentiment. I started to form a conception of Oromo identity early
on and continued to refine it over time. The events that I considered to be open to the
public and part of permissible observations without formal IRB approval included
markets, community meetings, public transportation, and public holidays. Observing
these events and public interactions shed light on the way Oromo people act and interact
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with other members of the Ethiopian population, as well as the way the Ethiopian state
polices and regulates Oromo behavior in public. Spending time travelling in rural
Oromiya gave me insight into the reach and nature of the Ethiopian police state in
different areas. My knowledge of Afan Oromo also legitimized and supported these
observations. I was able to take note of the way language is used and by whom, which
contributed to my understanding of the way Oromo culture is filtered through the
Ethiopian state.
Throughout the time I lived and worked in Oromiya I reflected extensively on the
subject matter of this thesis project, even though it was not my primarily endeavor at the
time. In my role as a high school teacher, and as regional leader for Peace Corps, I had
the opportunity to work intimately with diverse groups of Oromo people. I also had many
lengthy conversations with Oromo friends and colleagues around the topic of my thesis.
Although I did not record these conversations, they were heavily influential in shaping
the way I approached the subject and my research intent. Of the public events I witnessed
I kept reflective records even if they did not seem immediately relevant to Oromo
identity. These descriptions were typically handwritten, due to a lack of consistent
electricity or computer access. While I did not analyze these reflections methodically,
they were a useful resource later. Throughout the entirety of my 39 months in Ethiopia I
struggled with finding open, available internet access. Therefore, while I was able to
observe events taking place around me, and connect with friends in other parts of the
country via mobile phone when the network connection was available, it was difficult to
construct an accurate picture of events taking place across the nation. It was challenging
at times to confirm the violent rumors swirling around, due to the lack of news on state45

sponsored TV or radio. As best as I could, I compared personal notes with news
timelines to get a fuller understanding of how my reflections fit in the larger scheme and
timeline of the Oromo protests.
The justification behind using informal participant observation as opposed to a
more involved form of participant observation stems back to the issues of state violence
and oppression discussed throughout this thesis. Rules governing journalists and
terrorism have been loosely applied to persecute any forms of dissent. Putting my friends
and colleagues in a position where they could be associated with any anti-state sentiment
was simply not safe. The same concern led to the choice I made to interview members of
the diaspora only, and not include Oromos in the homeland. The Ethiopian government
owns and controls every form of telecommunication and has been known to listen in on,
selectively shut off, and otherwise manipulate communication. While living in Ethiopia I
personally experienced telecom issues with suspicious connections. This included
dropped phone calls while discussing protests, and a several week period where I was
unable to access my email after sending some potentially controversial documents. It’s
impossible to determine whether these issues were legitimately connected or
coincidental, but they were sufficient to discourage me from pursuing other more
engaged research methods.

Analysis of secondary sources
In order to interpret, compare, and confirm the conclusions drawn during the other
forms of data collection, I also conducted a critical review of the existing literature. The
secondary sources were also the focus of my historical analysis of the development of
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Oromumma as a political identity. The interpretation of secondary sources was an
important contribution to the research project for several reasons. First, in line with my
theoretical commitment to decolonizing methodologies, my analysis was a critical
rereading of Ethiopian history for its injustices and biases. To assess the way Oromumma
has been reclaimed and politicized by the Oromo people, and in the context of the Oromo
struggle, I relied primarily on the reporting found in Oromo-language or Oromo-run
media sources, reports from Oromo scholars, and social media accounts. For a view of
the international perspective on the politicization of Oromo identity, I relied on reporting
by English-language broadcasts and news sources. To analyze how Oromo identity has
been conceptualized or understood over time, I conducted interpretations and re-readings
of historical reporting and anthropological studies, with an attention to the bias of the
hegemonic Ethiopian narrative on the nature of the reporting, particularly in the early
days of state formation. For example, usage of the term Galla, a pejorative, to describe
the Oromo people without an acknowledgement of their feelings toward the term or selfidentification as Oromo is a demonstration of researcher bias. It is identifiable in
academic journal articles as well as popular news media and newspapers, and was a
common practice until the late 1970s. Smith describes this process as “coming to know
the past;” as an aspect of the larger methodological project of decolonization the research
will revisit sites of imperial history in order to “engage with, understand, and act upon”
these narrative spaces (2012:36). The results of this analysis can be found in the
following chapter.

In-depth interviews
During the winter and spring of 2019, I conducted 12 semi-structured interviews.
The participants were selected using snowball sampling. I began the snowball with
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Oromo people I knew personally who lived in the diaspora. Following the interviews I
asked participants to refer me to other Oromo people in the diaspora. Because the
snowball sample began with individuals I knew personally, each participant was aware of
my background as a researcher and my history with the Oromo people. I also
communicated with each respondent primarily in Afan Oromo prior to beginning the
interview, which built trust and early rapport. The interviews probed into four key
thematic categories:
•

Background: questions about the individuals’ family background, history, and the
logistics behind their movement into the diaspora;

•

Economic: questions relating to work, business, trade, access to goods and
services, and the neoliberal tendencies of the state;

•

Political: questions that probe the politics and law of Ethiopia, including how the
country is run, and how the Oromo people feel about this;

•

Cultural: questions dealing with the culture of Ethiopia, Oromo culture, and
interactions between the two;
The following table provides an overview of the demographic characteristics of

all interviewees, as well as their pseudonyms. The sample is fairly diverse, and I hope it
represents the diaspora experience relatively well but, given the sample size and the
qualitative nature of the study, the sample is not statistically representative. I did not
collect the participants’ ages, however determining the era they were born, and the
approximate age they were when they left paints a rough picture of how old they are. The
eras are named after the ruling force of each period, with the following approximate
timelines: Haile pre-1974, Dergue 1974-1991, EPRDF 1991-2018, Abiy 2018- now. As a
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specific example, Wayissa left Ethiopia near the end of the Haile Selassie era as a
college student in his early 20s. This means he is approximately 70 years old. “Region”
refers to the Ethiopian Zone where the individual was born or spent the majority of their
childhood, as it is located on the 2017 map. This distinction is important to note, as
Ethiopia has undergone several re-mappings over the past 75 year, with a new zone
districted into Oromiya in 2017. A map of the Oromiya region can be found in at the end
of the first chapter. However, as I discuss in the following chapters, I found that despite
differences in approximate age, childhood, and other traits, individuals shared similar
experiences and beliefs about Oromo identity.

Table 3: Research Participants
NAME
Obsee
Chalchissa
Ebba
Sanyii
Wayissa
Ayantu
Gifti
Badhaassaa
Bontu
Tolera
Biiftu
Abdi

GENDER
W
M
M
M
M
W
W
M
W
M
W
M

REGION
Illubabor
E. Wollega
W. Wollega
Illubabor
Arsi
Bedele
N. Showa
Bale
Illubabor
W. Wollega
Illubabor
W. Wollega

BORN
Dergue
Dergue
Haile
EPRDF
Haile
Haile
Dergue
Dergue
Haile
EPRDF
Dergue
Haile

LEFT
EPRDF
EPRDF
EPRDF
Abiy
Haile
EPRDF
EPRDF
EPRDF
EPRDF
EPRDF
EPRDF
Haile

Analysis of Interviews
In order to analyze and code the interviews I used a process called thematic
network analysis, based on the work of Attride-Stirling 2001. I originally intended to
transcribe and then code the interviews using Dedoose, but for several reasons I decided
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to do the transcriptions myself, and to analyze the data without using any qualitative
analysis software. This decision is justified and explained in the Coding section.

Transcription
The language barrier shaped my transcription practice. Several participants either
spoke no English, or heavily accented English, which made it impossible to rely on the
accurate transcription of an outside program. There is no existing software to transcribe
in Afan Oromo, and the work of correcting a transcription was comparable to transcribing
myself. There were also some issues of sound quality during the interviews. Because the
interviews took place over the phone, there were occasional network interruptions or
outside noises that affected the quality of the recording. This further discouraged me from
using an outside transcription program. Although I originally used Microsoft Word to
create my transcriptions, I switched to Excel after my first two interviews, and did all
further transcribing there. After conducting the interviews, I played them back once to
familiarize myself with the materials, and made notes of key topics or moments. On the
third pass, I did a more complete transcription. Certain sections were not transcribed
fully, but simply noted for content matter. The nature of this transcription process was
also influential in my coding system, and will be explained further here.
As stated above, certain sections were not transcribed fully. When a participant
described the geographic location of where they grew up, I would write a summary of
their statement and add a brief time stamp so I could refer back to it later. I also used this
method with longer tangents or anecdotes that were not necessarily pertinent to the
conversation. For example, one participant told a lengthy story about a historic Oromo
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general, Tadesse Biru. This retelling included details about his birth, political ascent,
and other information that, although factual, I was already familiar with. As I listened the
first time I noted “Tadesse Biru anecdote” and the start and end times as a line on the
coding sheet. On the second listen, I added some relevant details, but I did not transcribe
the full, three-minute anecdote. This strategic transcription simplified and streamlined the
coding process, and because each recording was listened to multiple times after the
original conversation, I feel the process was valid.
Abbreviated transcriptions were noted in the document, typically in [brackets] or
italic text. There were some sections or anecdotes I reviewed further, after full
transcription, to make sure the process was trustworthy. During these reviews I rarely
found the need to further transcribe an abbreviated section. This demonstrates the
reliability of the method, as I was not leaving out key pieces. An example of a section of
a transcription, with the Tadesse Biru interview mentioned above, can be found in the
appendix under the Methods section. The excerpts in that section were part of the
response to the prompt “Did you feel that there was equal access to work and jobs for
Oromos and other Ethiopians?”

Coding
The nature of the transcription was very influential on the coding process. After
the transcriptions were finished, the text was already in sections, or what Dedoose would
title “excerpts.” As such, to input this data into Dedoose would involve uploading it one
“excerpt” at a time, and adding the codes; over 1,000 pieces of individual excerpt data in
total. In many ways the process I used mirrors what Dedoose does, as will be explained
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here. I feel confident that the model I used, my familiarity with the text due to my
transcription, and the way the codes were developed and applied reflects an accurate
analysis of the data.
I completed the coding of my transcriptions using the method of Thematic
Network Analysis outlined by Attride-Stirling, a way to explore the significance of an
idea and how it is being understood by a group (2001:388). This is a systematic way of
identifying the more abstract ideas that organize themes and common statements, as well
as the larger overarching ideas that emerge from these themes. The starting categories,
what Attride-Stirling calls “basic themes,” were developed after an extensive review of
the literature. More specifically, these codes encompass the common features of postcolonial state development, as well as the historical tactics of Ethiopian politicization.
The themes were organized within four domains: Economic, Social, Cultural, and
Background. The latter category encompasses statements that were factual and apolitical
in nature, for example the year a respondent was born. This data was not analyzed, but
used as a reference.
Once the preliminary codes delineating “basic themes” (Economic, State,
Cultural, Background) were applied, the excerpts were moved to a separate Excel sheet,
one for each thematic category. This is essentially a manual way of doing what a program
like Dedoose would do automatically. It also follows Attride-Stirling’s model (2001:392).
Within their thematic sheet, these excerpts were further coded for examples of the
different features of each of these domains. By reading through the excerpts again in the
context of their thematic category and coding for specific examples, I was able to refine
the coding process. If an excerpt originally coded as Political was not actually an
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example of a specific political act, for example, I typically found that it may have
actually been a background piece, such as a timeline of monarchs. I also took note of
intersections with the other thematic categories, and explored these. A list of codes and
terms can be found in the appendix in the Methods section.
It is important to note that these codes were developed during the completion of
both the substantive literature review and the analytical framework. They therefore reflect
both the theoretical features of a post-colonial state and the ways this has historically
manifested itself in Ethiopia, each piece of which is explained elsewhere. I used a “Key
Definitions” sheet to guide this process, which can be found in the appendix, alongside an
example of a series of excerpts that were coded as “Political” and then further coded for
their particular feature: Necropower, Subordination, Othering, or Sovereignty.
In order to deconstruct the information in these basic thematic categories, they
were read as a unit, and thus analyzed for patterns and commonalities. In the sample text
below, the first excerpt was coded as Necropower because it was an example of the
institutionalization and state sponsoring of death, as it speaks of the “eradicating” of
Oromos due to government policy. When all of the Necropower codes are grouped
together, certain themes and patterns emerged. These patterns were rewritten and
combined into Organizing Themes. Organizing Themes are more abstract, and both
“group the main ideas proposed by several Basic Themes, and dissect the main
assumptions underlying a broader theme” (Attride-Stirling 2001:389). Here I deviated
somewhat from Attride-Stirling in that I created Organizing Themes from within each
“Basic” thematic or analytical category (Economic, Social, Political). For example, an
Organizing Theme was created around the common features of Political codes. When
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Necropower is discussed, in what context, by which actors, and how it interrupts the
lives of Oromo people are all pieces of the larger Political puzzle, and help explicate the
nature of politicization; Organizing Themes connect and help make sense of these
patterns.
The coding guide I used lists the basic themes as well as the specific features of
these themes, which follow directly from the analytical model and an analysis of the
substantive literature. These features, particularly the theoretical category, encompass a
number of actions and interactions. For example, the code “education” includes
discussion of specific content (what was studied), infrastructure of educational
institutions (number of schools and their location), and access to education, among other
things. Each of these pieces is part of the Political domain of politicization. As part of the
process of creating Organizing Themes, the role of education within the larger Political or
state project was made clearer. What Attride-Stirling calls “Global Themes” are the ideas
that group together and make sense of each of these Organizing Themes. Global Themes
reveal the underlying issues connecting each unique domain and form one cohesive
network. These are explained at the conclusion of the thesis.
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CHAPTER IV: POLITICIZATION OF OROMUMMA OVER TIME
Introduction
This section provides a critical analysis of the way Oromumma has been
politicized over time, using the framework presented above. Looking at the changes in
the politicization of identity over time elucidates the way the Abyssinian/ Ethiopian state
manipulates ethnic identity to maintain hierarchal power, as well as the way oppressed
people create forms of resistance that counteract this strategy of state domination. The
Oromo people have changed their tactics of resistance to react to the constantly evolving
oppression of the state. They have also developed their own proactive methods of
denying and fighting against the necropower of the various Ethiopian regimes. Looking
at these relationships through the lens of the politicization of identity is a key component
of understanding how current Oromo identity in the diaspora is constructed, and what it is
rooted in. This chapter is divided into sections based on shifts in governance or forms of
politicization, as follows:
1. Free Oromiya: a broad overview of the Oromo people and key cultural
characteristics prior to colonization
2. Menelik: the colonization of the Oromo and the embedding of historic prejudice
into law
3. Haile Selassie: the reformation of Abyssinia into modern day Ethiopia
4. The Dergue: a fascist regime responsible for mass death
5. Revolution/ State formation: analysis of the key challenges and early work in
recreating the state
6. #OromoProtests: identity politicization as resistance to state violence
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Section I: Free Oromiya
The Oromo have been living in the highlands and plains of the Horn of Africa
since the beginning of their cultural consciousness. Reports by Islamic travelers in the
10th and 11th century provide some of the first written documentation of Oromo existence,
referencing their territory as expanding into or bordering modern-day Somalia (Tasamma
and Waaqwayya 1995:21). Historically, Oromo society was made up of six tribes,
interconnected by a shared religion and Oromo language, and governed by a system of
equal representation called the Gadaa system. Each of these features makes up a core part
of the Oromo historical inheritance, and an understanding of these elements is one of the
shared traits of the Oromo cultural community (Jalata 2012). Prior to colonization by the
Shoan Emperor Menelik in the late 1880s, Oromumma was the spiritual connecting force
across a vast land space. Once consolidated, the Abyssinian empire disrupted these
systems of governance and kinship, but the legacies of each are visible in modern-day
expressions of Oromumma. Language, religion, governance, and land are the
foundational elements of Oromumma, each with a unique relationship to the resilience
and shape of Oromo cultural identity over time.
The Oromo religious system before Abyssinian colonization is indicative of the
Oromo worldview and set of meanings. Known as Waaqeeffanna or Waqqayya, it is
based on a belief in Waaqa, the Oromo concept for God. Waaqa for the Oromo is a part
of the land and nature as much as spiritual being; practicing Waaqeeffanna is recognizing
that Waaqa is both one and many, inhabiting the seven skies above and below the ground
(Ruda 1993:97). This conception of the world places the value of the natural world and
process as equal or greater in importance to that of the people (Orlowska 2013:312).
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Evidence of this behavior is seen is sustainable land use practices that characterize
Oromo agriculture in rural areas, and the significance given to animal and plant life (Tufa
and Gebremariam 2017). During Waaqeeffanna celebrations and Gadaa meetings Oromo
people gather around Odaa trees, one of nearly a dozen trees thought to have a distinct
spirit, or ayana (Mergo 2012:107). The unique nature of Oromo relationships to and
treatment of land was noted even by Abyssinian invaders in the 1840s (Hassen
2007:151). Language use also reflects the sustenance of Oromo concepts, as names that
come from Waaqeeffanna beliefs and concepts are still popular today, even among
Muslims and Christians. Ayana, meaning spirit, Urgeessa, a scented ceremonial plant,
and Ateetee are all examples of names that came from pre-colonial religious and cultural
practices and are still common across generations, despite religious conversion.
Furthermore, there is no concept of the “wilderness” in the Oromo worldview or
language, even today. Although the majority of the Oromo people currently practice
Islam or a type of Christianity, the symbolic meaning of Waaqa is still a part of Oromo
life, and many Oromo celebrate Waaqeeffanna holidays, like Irreecha, alongside that of
their primary religion (Gebissa 2008). In addition, in rural Northwestern Oromiya, one of
the most remote and underdeveloped regions, the Horro Oromo still use customary rituals
related to forest resources in response to outside social problems (Mergo 2012:111).
Prior to colonization, the Oromo people were entirely governed by the Gadaa
system, and some vestiges of it are at least ceremonially active today. Under this model,
each local Oromo group subdivided the population into age categories, and children were
raised alongside their peers and “educated in Oromo history, military strategy, law, and
governance” as they moved towards higher levels of power and societal importance
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(Keller 1995:624). There was one central leadership forum of elders responsible for
settling disputes and addressing issues of justice, and its leader was called the Abba
Gadaa, or Father of the Gadaa. The women’s council, which worked in conjunction with
the men’s, though often litigating different issues, was called the Siqqee. This Siqqee
system was separate, and had functional independence, which allowed for women to
protect “themselves and each other from abuse and allowed women to control essential
economic assets” (Jalata and Schaffer 2013:282). Though not an entirely and equitable
society, the importance of women was firmly established in its forms of governance. The
tribal identity of the leadership position rotated so that each tribe was equally represented
in power (Knutsson 1963).
Like Oromo religious beliefs, the Gadaa system emphasized community, sharing,
and group membership, and functions as a “system of cooperation, social integration, and
enforcement of moral conduct” (Gebissa 2008:2). During times of conflict with nonOromo tribes, conquered people were given the option to maintain their own belief
systems but were considered Oromo if they adapted Oromo beliefs and learned the
Oromo language (Ruda 1993:288). Currently, the symbol of the Odaa tree, the sycamore
under which gatherings were held during the Gadaa era, is featured on the flags of both
the state-sponsored and resistance-based parties, making it one of the most highly
politicized elements of Oromo cultural identity (Jalata 2001). This structure of Oromo
community was a direct contrast to the beliefs of the Abyssinian Empire, who were
directly responsible for the hierarchal nature of Ethiopian state and interstate politics
today. A foundational piece of Orthodox Christian state rule was church-owned land,
leased only to elites and church leaders (Hassen 2012:276). This practice of hoarding
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power was mirrored in other forms of governance. Towards the end of the era of a free
Oromiya, accommodating Oromo leaders, and the collaborative upper class in Shoa,
sought to reform the Gadaa to meet the needs of those encroaching. These attempts
changed the structure but not the core values of the system (Flintan 2010:155). Today, the
Gadaa still elects leadership and leads seasonal prayers, but it is largely a ceremonial role
(BBC 2017). The intersecting roles of religion and governance, threaded together by a
shared language, work in conjunction to create the basis of what is generally recognized
as Oromumma.
Land for the Oromo people has been a site of political, economic, and cultural
battles since the time of colonization. The historic Oromo religion and worldview were
centered on Mother Oromiya (Haadha), and their relationship with her. Addis Ababa,
which became the capital of the empire, was Oromiya’s haandhura (bellybutton or
umbilical cord) the heart of the land (Ararssa 2018:1). Colonizing forces saw land as a
source of income, a pathway to the markets at Khartoum, and a breeding ground for
slaves (Edwards 1982). This commodification of land and human labor seeped into
relations across the country. Since the end of the Free Oromo era, the Oromo homeland
has been used and manipulated by state powers for economic and political gain. There
has been little respect or acknowledgment of the psychological losses felt by attacks on
the Haadha, or the factories built on the haandhura. In approaching my analysis from a
decolonizing perspective, I therefore seek to highlight the cultural impacts of Abyssinian
colonial domination. As discussed further, the land grabs and appropriation of land by the
Ethiopian state have been economically motivated, but their implementation would not
have been possible without the initial cognitive separation between the native land and
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the Native people who came from that land. Failing to recognize the transit of empire
over time, and the traces of the colonial into the post-colonial era, produces a narrow and
inadequate understanding of the relationship between Oromo land and the Ethiopian
state, reducing it to legal terms and political maps. Seeing the way the empire and its
tactics of oppression are reified and given new life in modern systems is necessary to
fully understand the conditions of the Oromo. The roots of Oromo cultural identity I have
described in this section became the basis of subsequent Oromo political identities of
resistance over time.

Section II: Colonization (1880s-1930)
Until the late 1800s, Oromiya remained relatively undisturbed by both foreign
conquerors and travellers, and those outsiders who had entered Oromo land had not
noticeably interrupted Oromo cultural practices. Islam had both infiltrated and been
welcomed in to varying extents, and in general did little to disrupt the traditional lifeways
of the Oromo. Instead, many Oromo people began converting to Islam as a check on
rising Amhara nationalism in Shoa and Christian violence in areas like Harar (Jaenen
1956:177; Bariagaber 1998:1060). British explorers in the 1860s crafted entire missions
with the intention of entering Oromo country, describing it as a site ripe for colonization
and Christianization (Dufton 1862:488). Menelik, the emperor of Shoa at the time, had
similar values and intentions. Thus the subjugation and eventual colonization of the
Oromo was in some ways a Muslim-Christian conflict as much as one that was motivated
by imperial interests. The most notable legacy of this era was the full consolidation of
what comprises modern day Ethiopia. During the reign of Menelik the last Oromo rebels
60

were negotiated with, suppressed, or slaughtered. National borders were redrawn and
land was redistributed to maintain hierarchal, Habesha power.
Although subsequent regimes have gained more notoriety internationally, the
consolidated Abyssinian state was responsible for extensive, strategic and organized
political violence. Jalata describes five institutions that were the foundation of Ethiopian
settler colonialism: slavery, the Nafxanya-Gabbar system (semi-slavery), garrison cities,
an Oromo collaborative class, and the colonial landholding system (2001:2). The primary
two institutions listed by Jalata, slavery and the Nafxanya-Gabbar system, are most
pertinent to this discussion, and had the most uniform impact across the country. Whereas
the Oromo collaborative class was present most strongly in Shoa, and with certain
examples standing out as more egregious like that of Ras Gobana, the Gadaa system
managed to resist most of this colonial infiltration and divisive tactics (Ta’a 2008:74). In
the Nafxanya-Gabbar system over two-thirds of the colonized land was expropriated and
divided amongst wealthy landlords (Markakis 1989:119). The resettlement and
implementation of the of the Nafxanya-Gabbar system has had the longest lasting
impacts, and likely served as inspiration for resettlement projects undertaken by the
Dergue and the reformist EPRDF government in the 20th and 21st centuries, discussed
later. Under this model, the most fertile parts of the empire were systematically registered
and redistributed under a land-tenure system that granted control to Amhara and Tigrayan
outsiders, leaving Indigenous Oromo farmers landless and forced to toil for tribute rations
(Bassi and Megerssa 2008:98).
Another important legacy of Menelik’s was the beginning of the import of
European weaponry, a key tool in his colonial pursuits. Christian empires in Europe
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exported rifles and other weaponry to Habesha colonists fighting pagan and Muslim
southerners (Jalata and Schaffer 2013:281). The acquisition and distribution of guns was
itself a highly politicized process. Early desires for weaponry and the process through
which they were acquired “had important diplomatic consequences” for the very
foundation of the Ethiopian nation, including determining future relationships with
nations like France and Britain, and supporting the colonial invasion of the south
(Pankhurst 1965:30). It was also this weaponry that helped Menelik to overthrow the
Italian invaders during the Battle of Adwa. Memorialized in the Ethiopian historiography
as an anti-colonial glory, many of these narratives leave out the role of enslaved
Ethiopian people and subjects, in particular the Oromo, as key labor in this victory.
Menelik had difficulty rousing colonial subjects by rhetorical means, with speeches from
this era showing that he first sought to use Orthodox Christian nationalist ideas before
conceding, “I don’t think I have treated you badly… if you decide to do nothing after you
had [sic] heard this proclamation, I will punish you” (Giorgis 2010:86). Oromo slaves
were thus brought from the south to fight for a colonial ruler they did not believe in. We
can therefore see how Menelik framed the position of colonized Oromos and other people
within Abyssinia: as weaponry, tools, and mechanisms for glory.
Fueling both Menelik’s war chest and his motivation for continued violence was
the economic potential of Oromiya and the Oromo people. Menelik exploited the wealth
of the Oromo wherever possible, as a slave trader, mine contractor, and plantation owner.
When people would not be kidnapped and sold, he simply killed them and took their land
(Jalata 2001:100). This late colonial empire used some rhetorical tactics to justify its
means, framing the Oromo as pagan savages, but in general the economic justification
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proved sufficient (Yates 2016:199). Oromiya and Oromumma were reduced to slave
laborers, coffee farms, cattle ranches, and gold mines. It was reported that Menelik and
his wife owned over 70,000 enslaved African people, while tributes from the last
sovereign Oromo kingdom, Jimma’s Abba Jifar, included “ivory, civet, honey, gold” and
other products like coffee (Edwards 1982; Gemeda 2002:53). The Oromo people’s worth
as a community was limited to their economic value. Menelik and his policies took what
was a sacred part of the Oromo community, their land and their bodies, and permanently
reimagined it as a commodity. This pattern of alienation, commodification, and
exploitation was justified by employing a savage narrative surrounding the “black”
Oromo. Tibebu notes how Habesha people were “painted white” after their defeat of the
Italians, later on in Menelik’s rule, as a way for Europeans to reconcile this victory
(1996:419). This cognitive separation thus became an internal and international rhetorical
tool to justify the use of violence against the Oromo.
At the time of Menelik’s death it was noted that Ethiopia would be a formidable
challenge to any attempted conqueror, as “its mountainous people were very well armed”
(Pankhurst 1965:32). The nation was cohering around a Habesha ideal and the country
was well supplied with weaponry, including guns and cannons, and increasingly
modernizing. Menelik named his successor towards the end of his reign in 1909,
selecting Iyasu, the son of a Wollo prince and his own daughter (Reid 2011:129). Iyasu,
known as Lij or Child Iyasu, began his rule in 1911 while his grandfather quietly died. He
was a prominent slave trader, but beyond this he was a contrarian to Menelik’s Shoan
Abyssinian vision. Iyasu instead moved many power structures north from Addis to
Wollo and Tigray, and spent large amounts of time with the Muslim people of the
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Ogaden and Ethiopian Somali, leaving the Shoa people feeling neglected and
discontent (Reid 2011:131). This discontent would steep with the Shoan nobility for
several decades, and while Iyasu ruled, his usurper was already in the process of planning
his future rule.
Notably absent from this section is any account of Oromo resistance. This is an
accurate reflection of the all-encompassing nature of Abyssinian colonization, as it
strategically attacked each identifiable piece of Oromo culture. As an unintended
consequence, it strengthened the Oromos’ resolve to continue traditions, speak the
language, and live with the land outside of Abyssinian control. Thus began the dialect
between the Empire’s repeated attempts to oppressively politicize the Oromo out of
existence, and the Oromo working against and despite these laws to highlight and
reinforce their values. As was the case with empires across the global South, “ethnicity
(tribalism) thus came to be simultaneously the form of colonial control over natives and
the form of revolt against it” (Mamdani 1996:24).

Section 3: Haile Selassie (1930-1974)
The reign of Emperor Haile Selassie solidified the tendencies and trends of the
Abyssinian, Shoan, and Axumite Empires into a cohesive “Ethiopian” vision —
Amharic speaking, Orthodox Christian, and Habesha. It is this vision, of the last
“African” King, that has endured; obfuscating the fact that the “Lion of Judah” owned
African people as slaves, that he was intolerant of any deviance from his Habesha ideal,
and that his victories were won with forced labor and the blood of the oppressed. While
speaking to the United States Congress, Selassie described Ethiopia as “a Christian island
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in a sea of Islam,” making explicit the historical inheritance he intended to carry forth,
and his views on more than half of his own country (Markakis 1989:119). Challenging
the legacy of Haile Selassie as a savior and acknowledging the violence he embedded
into the state he built is a key aspect of analyzing Ethiopia’s place in the post-colonial
world, and as a settler colony. The process of state solidification in Ethiopia significantly
altered the economic, cultural, and political landscape of the Horn of Africa.
Before assuming the throne in 1930, Ras (a title for a regional king or prince)
Tafari Makonnen was the governor of the then-province of Harar and had a history of
oppressing and profiting off Oromo land and labor (Pankhurst 1961:61). Tafari formed
political alliances with leaders from Shoa, and throughout his career focused on Addis
Ababa as the ultimate site of his political aspirations (Reid 2011:132). Tafari first found a
position of power in 1916 with great support from Shoan nobility, eager to restore their
rule back from the descendants of Menelik (Gebissa 2002:75). After deposing of the
former emperor and leaving him incarcerated and in chains, Tafari was elevated to the
title of Negus in 1928, and formally claimed the throne in November of 1930, crowned as
Emperor Haile Selassie (Reid 2011:135). His claim to the throne was partially predicated
on his ancestry; he claimed to be a descendent of the ancient Solomonic line, and when
challenged he used his military connections to change minds. Despite proclaiming
himself a modern ruler, reports show that during the 1920s and 1930s, slavery and the
slave trade were key to the economic structure of the country (Bassi and Megerssa
2008:110; Edwards 1982:8). Some went further, noting that slavery as an institution was
embedded into the Ethiopian social structure and ideology as well (Polson 1936:650).
Based on his early actions as a leader, it is clear that Selassie long used the Pan-Ethiopian
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colonial vision as away of obscuring his strategic ethnic violence. Slavery as a
particular institution is unique in its complete dehumanization and violence. No rhetorical
devices can obscure this fact, or what it conveys about the nature of Habesha-Oromo
relations during this time.
Also important to understanding the condition of the Oromo during this era are
the larger global events of the era of “Fascism and Appeasement” which saw modernized
weaponry and war technology dramatically change the nature of international conflict
(Pankhurst 1965:33). The Italians, led by Mussolini, conquered Abyssinia in 1935, with
the intent to conquer the rest of the country, despite Selassie’s considerable efforts “to
avoid trouble” (Woolbert 1935:505). After the fall of Addis Ababa, the Emperor fled.
While the Shoan stalwarts and established Amhara rulers took the invasion as a colonial
threat, the colonized Oromo and southern peoples saw hope for liberation. There is a
definite irony in seeking freedom from an invading colonial empire; this speaks to the
extent of the violence of Abyssinian colonial rule. In some cases, Oromo leaders openly
supported and provided soldiers to the Italians, or to anti-Abyssinian forces, and the
Italians began to see that “anti-Amhara and therefore anti-Ethiopian” sentiments could be
pulled out of “ the peasantry” (Jesman 1963:58). There are reports that areas of the
country where the Italians were unable to penetrate saw “the conquered people…
beginning to take action to liberate themselves,” particularly in the South (Gebissa
2002:79).
At the onset of the Italian invasion, the southwestern part of the country,
including Gambella and modern day South Sudan, was a British protectorate, and thus
Oromo elites with access to political power saw a British mandate as the ideal option for
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transitioning into a fully independent state (Ta’a 2008:68). While Selassie fled and
sought protection from European allies, Oromo people organized and tried again to gain
freedom. However, the international governing bodies they appealed to were slow to
respond. While the Italians were being torn in different directions, and facing censure
from international leaders, they were eventually ejected from the country in 1941, when
Selassie returned to the throne (Gebissa 2002:76). It was during this era, from the 1940s
until he was deposed during the 1970s, that Selassie refined his politicizing tactics into a
cohesive force. Haile Selassie’s finesse and ability to create narratives were one of his
greatest strengths as a leader, particularly on the global stage. He used Pan-African
rhetoric to obscure the devastation taking place at home, as each aspect of Oromo culture
was politicized towards oppressive ends. As Hassen details, while Selassie was giving
speeches at global assemblies:
Oromo cultural and religious shrines and places of worship were
destroyed. Oromo place names were replaced by Amharic names. The
Oromo language was banned from being used for preaching, teaching, and
writing. The Oromo national identity was attacked and the Oromo way of
life was condemned in every way. The regime’s educational system,
cultural institutions, and government bureaucracy were deployed for the
express purpose of denigrating the Oromo people, their history, culture,
and way of life (2002:21).
By identifying and subsequently restricting so many specific aspects of Oromo culture,
Selassie turned ethnic identity into a political tool. While the Emperor did not go so far as
to identify Oromumma as an enemy of the state, he created an idealized Abyssinian
identity and left little room for characteristics that existed outside of it.
Selassie’s tactics of economic politicization were tightly intertwined with his
cultural narratives, in a way that was much more explicit and successful than his
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predecessors. He excluded Oromo people from the labor market and economic growth
wherever possible. The methods used included permitting name-based discrimination, for
example (Bulcha 1997:338). There were a few practices that were primarily economic in
nature though, most notably his upholding of the Nafxanya-Gabbar semi-slavery system,
and his use of tribute, bribes, and economic exploitation to maintain dominance over the
last vestiges of Oromo legal sovereignty (Gemeda 2002:60; Hassen 2002:21). The
Emperor also relied on Indigenous farming practices and expertise to grow and prepare
the coffee that made up vast quantities of monthly tribute from Jimma, the last Oromo
kingdom (Lewis 1965). This exploitative system maintained the Abyssinian position in
the international markets.
Although the era of Emperor Selassie was distinct for some of its politicizing
mechanisms, it was also a time of renewal in the spirit of Oromumma as a united political
force. This politicization of Oromumma resulted in Oromo people organizing and
drawing on the strengths of Oromo culture to assert themselves as a resistance to the
violence of the Ethiopian state. The two most salient examples of this are the Western
Oromo Confederation and the Macha Tulama Self-Help Association. That both of these
groups came from the Western part of Oromiya speaks to the post-colonial condition of
the country. While the North and East were occupied by Habesha invaders, the South was
still primarily rural pastoralists, facing their own issues with the Somalis along British
colonial lines, and the Central Oromo Shoan were largely assimilated or part of the
collaborationist classes; thus Western Oromos had strategic historical and geographic
advantages (Pankhurst 1961; Lewis 1965; Keller 1995). More importantly, Selassie and
his collaborators were dependent on exports from the coffee-rich area, as well as the
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stability from the Jimma-Juba road, a major trade route (Gemeda 2002:58). Thus the
Abyssinian imperial forces were reticent to enact extensive destruction. The attacks were
generally more strategically political and legal in nature, relating to language and religion
as discussed previously.
In May of 1936 several prominent community leaders formed the Western Oromo
Confederation (WOC), uniting the provincial rulers of East and West Wollega, Jimma,
and Beni-Shangul (Gebissa 2002:81). These leaders worked to form a more cohesive
vision before submitting a formal letter to the British consul, stating that as a nation, the
country of Western Oromia “had not benefited from its incorporation into the Abyssinian
state” as the empire had now become, and thus wished for its own independence (Gebissa
2002:85). This was the first time the Oromo had been able to make explicit the nature of
their relationships with the Ethiopian state, rather than having their voices filtered
through the empire. The Macha Tulama Self-Help Association (MTSHA) was formed by
the Oromo educated class in 1963 (Jalata 2002:138). Because they were “barred by the
Ethiopian Constitution from establishing a political organization,” the MTSHA’s stated
objectives focused on improving Oromo society more generally (Jalata 2002:138). State
elites refused to accept the MTSHA’s work, and believed they had a subversive political
agenda, subjecting them to harassment and violence, and limiting their effectiveness
(Gudina 2007:89). These organizations show that the Oromo began to resist Ethiopian
state violence by organizing and following structural protocol, despite the state’s
response. This was an attempt to negotiate for peace and freedom through diplomatic
efforts, rather than violence.
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Other notable resistance movements during this time include the guerilla
struggles of Bale during the 1960s, during which the Ethiopian state “needed the aid of
Israeli explosive experts, British Army bridge and road builders, and American Air Force
advisers… to withstand the insurgents” (OLF 1974:7). In addition to these rebel
movements, there is evidence to suggest that many of the more rural Oromo peoples, in
particular the Borana pastoralists in the South, continued to practice a functional version
of the Gadaa system throughout this era (Bassi 2010:222). The continuance of the Gadaa
is exemplary of non-state sovereignty, allowing the Oromo people to self-govern in a
form unrecognizable by the state. No organization fighting for Oromo freedom would see
their dreams of liberation come to fruition during the Selassie era. However, the roots of
these forces of resistance, as well as an awakening to the potential political power of the
Oromo people, both within and outside of state models, would truly bear fruit during
subsequent regimes.
In addition to his violence towards the Oromo, Emperor Selassie oppressed and
mismanaged the state on multiple levels, ignoring or willfully mishandling famines in the
late 1940s and 1950s (Dugassa 2008:185; Reid 2011:152). As his actions began to have
a more pan-ethnic impact, he grew increasingly unpopular and insecure in his position.
He managed to withstand a coup attempt while on a diplomatic trip in the 1960s, but
could not quell the rising tide of protests which began to grow after this bold move
(Tolossa 1997:10; Reid 2011:154). At that time, many of the key people in power,
including many military officials, tended to be highly nationalistic but had little
commitment to the imperial line, preferring the hierarchal nature of the system of
governance and the continuance of Amhara dominance, but failing to see Selassie himself
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as the best means of preserving this system (Markakis 1989). After decades of violence,
including another major famine in 1973, the brutal rule of the last Emperor came to an
end. The population responsible for the final overthrow of Selassie came from among the
“urban populace… university professors and high school teachers, students, young
bureaucrats and public employees, industrial workers, daily laborers, unemployed youths,
and soldiers,” who worked within their limited means to put an end to his rule (Kebedde
1987:2). After several changes in leadership, a series of very public executions, and
multiple ideological rebrandings, the Dergue came to power in the mid-1970s.

Section 4: The Dergue (1974-1991)
The rule of the Dergue is known in the Ethiopian cultural consciousness as the
Red Terror. The shape and direction of this terror formation changed dramatically from
its inception during a “bloodless revolution” to its violent end, as liberation fronts from
all sides joined forces against it (“Slaughter in Ethiopia” 1974). Coming at the end of the
brutal ethnonationalist reign of Haile Selassie, the Dergue was initially brimming with
hope and new ideas, promising to restructure and listen to the needs of the marginalized.
They did not claim any particular ethnic group, nor were they as explicitly anti-Oromo as
their predecessors (Gudina 1997; Joireman 1997). Instead, they sought to unite the
masses against the tyranny of the ruling class, promising “Ethiopia first, but without
bloodshed” (Tareke 2008:189) When the Dergue took over in 1974, 90% of the
population lived as subsistence farmers, a large percent toiling away under the remnants
of the Nafxanya-Gabbar system. Their first act was to disinherit “the predatory landed
classes” and to divest the Orthodox Church of its vast land holdings (Tareke 2008:185).
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With all of this early promise, the Dergue’s eventual failure can be blamed on a few
key issues: their inability to reign in greed, violent internal and external conflict, and the
inadequacy of their investments into the institutions needed to implement their grand
goals.
The goals and intentions of the Dergue regime, although filled with a
revolutionary and anti-monarchal sentiment, were not made clear until nearly a quarter of
the way into their reign, and even then they were tenuous. The first five years were
mostly characterized by a pacification campaign, actually riddled with violence. After
uniting enough of the key governing factions the Dergue produced an outline of their
intended program: land reform (after pressure from the peasantry and urban poor), an
improvement of material conditions across the country, and the destruction of the
“socioeconomic foundations of the old regime” (Halliday and Molyneaux 1982:5). Each
of these ideas appealed to the Ethiopian masses, but the regime’s failure to turn these
ideas into concrete, practical policies was part of their undoing. During this era,
Oromumma became militarized and organized through the work of the Oromo Liberation
Front, who retained popular legitimacy as other movements fell to divisiveness,
continually drawing on their social and cultural network as a unifying force (Bariagaber
1998:1063). In general, the Dergue era’s politicization of identity heightened existing and
historic tensions, though in some cases it served to mollify previous disagreements by
creating a newer, greater evil.
Politicization of culture during the Dergue era was an explicit state project. In
contrast to Emperor Selassie’s policies targeting cultural practice that were hyper-focused
against the Oromo, the Dergue acted broadly, suppressing any potential ethnic
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politicization. Sentiments that seemed to reflect specific ethnic projects were decried as
“narrow nationalism,” and political activists marked with this label were jailed or killed
(Hassen 2002:25). The Dergue method for dealing with the so-called nationalities
problem was “scientific socialism,” which ignored ethnicity and instead uses
socioeconomic roles and positions in order to classify people (Keller 1995:628). In some
ways The Dergue had a much keener understanding of the power of historical inheritance
and culture, as their “policy towards ethnic groups was to allow, and even to stimulate,
cultural articulation of ethnicity, but to suppress political expressions of it” (Aalen
2006:246). Cultural articulation includes language use, which turns into political
expression when used as a way to organize or form non-governmental groups.
The Dergue’s attempts to redistribute wealth under a reformed system of
governance were unsuccessful in part because this system itself was never made
intelligible. It nationalized the land without having a strategy in place for redistribution. It
sent students on a mobilization campaign without having an institutional structure in
place for these new nationalists to organize around (paraphrased Holliday and Molyneaux
1982:7). Beyond these organizational shortcomings, this attempt at a socialist
reorganization failed in part because the deeply entrenched nature of ethnic identity was
so connected to wealth and capital (Bariagaber 1998:1061). Attempts at wealth
redistribution through the government collectivization of land and other techniques failed
because the capitalist class and industry were left untouched in each reform. Although it
lacked organizing principles, there were pieces of the Dergue rule that showed promise
for a brighter Oromo future. The Dergue lifted Selassie’s ban on printing and
broadcasting local languages and made Islam an official state religion (Markakis
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1989:123). They also strategically severed the monopoly of Amhara political rule, a
step meant to make state/ national identity more powerful than ethnicity (Markakis
1989:124; Tolossa 1997:4). Also promising was their support of some Pan-African
liberation struggles taking place at the time (Orlowska 2013:303). These actions had an
important impact on linguistic and cultural development, and show some evidence of the
Dergue’s attempts to actualize the revolutionary ideals it proclaimed.
Although the feudal land system had been eliminated, the villagization projects
and nationalization of other resources in Oromia caused a “widespread feeling that the
Oromo were… treated as ‘second-class citizens’” (Joireman 1997:394). In addition to
resettlement on existing land holdings, some villages were developed or constructed as a
strategic way of controlling the activities of the Oromo people, and were located in
former rebel strongholds like Wollega (Cohen and Isakson 1988:329; Dugassa
2008:132). As these systems were put into place, the coordinated movements of the
Dergue were “the first time in the twentieth century that Oromos in six provinces were
attacked simultaneously” (Hassen 2002:23). The Dergue originally attempted to “harness
Oromo nationalist sentiment to the class struggle” but had underestimated the cultural
roots and relations of the Oromo (Markakis 1989:125). This strategic violence
crystallized the revolutionary tendencies of groups like the Oromo Liberation Front and
reaffirmed their belief that life in the Ethiopian nation-state was untenable (OLF 1974).
The type of sovereignty that these values necessitate would not bend to the constructs of
the post-colonial state, regardless of its leadership. The Oromo saw the ruling party and
in particular the Habesha elites as settler colonists, living and working on stolen land
(Jalata 2001:2). Negotiating for freedom from this tyranny reaffirmed the kinship values
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of the Oromo and the necessity for an Oromumma that could resist future violence. As
Dugassa notes, “the motto they died for—unity—is the aspiration of millions of young
Oromos” (2008:127).

Section 5: State Reformation and Solidification Post-1991
The overthrow of the Dergue regime in 1991 both reaffirmed and challenged
some of the historical political constructs of the Ethiopian state. Although ultimately
unable to truly reform the state, it was the first time Oromo people were given a real
political voice. It also demonstrated the potential of cross-ethnic and diverse religious
forces in implementing sustainable change, as the success of the 1991 revolution
necessitated collaboration between liberation fronts across border, ethnic, and religious
lines (Dugassa 2008:176; Reid 2011; Weldemichael 2013). In the years immediately
following the revolution, there was little clear sense of what the future of the Ethiopian
political or legal landscape would look like. It is important to note that just two years
prior to the 1991 revolution, potential dissidents who attempted a coup were “tortured to
death before their mutilated bodies were tied to cars and dragged through the streets”
(Weldemichael 2013:257). During the process of state formation, ethnicity hung like a
shadow in every conversation, whether or not it was being explicitly addressed; the
reputations, histories, and core cultural differences of the major groups imbued each
interaction with a particular tension (Hassen 2002; Michael 2008; Hagmann and Abbink
2011). The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), made up primarily of EPRDF
members, eventually “came to the conclusion that the role of ethnicity could not be
ignored in the peace that was now to be administered” (Joireman 1997:397). This made
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ethnicity a key factor in the re-organization of Ethiopia. The decisions made during this
brief period give insight into the deeply entrenched nature of elite Ethiopian political
power, as groups were forced back or firmly inscribed into the margins under the new
laws.
Although representatives from all ethnic groups and parties were initially invited
to the national sessions for negotiating and writing state policy, these invitations did not
actually translate into an equitable voice (Orlowska 2013:299). During the 1992 elections
groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front were accused of terrorist activities and swiftly
excluded from participation, and the socialist movement, Islamic organizations, and other
parties either boycotted the elections in response to this or were excluded for other
reasons (Gudina 2011:668). The Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front, the
group given the most credit for the revolution quickly rose to power. Although pan-ethnic
in name, the EPRDF was “anchored by the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Fronts which
provided 50 percent of its fighters and played a controlling role on its executive
committee” (Joireman 1997:393). Thus a seemingly apolitical and pan-ethnic movement
was actually been a means of obfuscating the continued violence of the elites (Clapham
2009; Feyissa and Lawrence 2014; Arriola and Lyons 2016:77). Many sources from this
era report that the EPRDF created puppet parties like the Oromo People’s Democratic
Organization (OPDO) with the primary intent of undermining the political power and
reach of the OLF, and manufacturing mouthpieces for the ruling party (Keller 1995;
Sorensen 1996; Ayele 2017). The early organization of the OPDO by former EPRDF
fighters was forceful and manipulative. Membership was non-negotiable for many
people, and often work or loss of property were the consequences of a refusal to join.
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Soon, openly supporting the OLF was a crime punishable by imprisonment, torture, or
death, and OLF members were held in remote internment camps to guarantee EPRDF
victory in the center (Dugassa 2008:175; Weldemichael 2013:278). The EPRDF and its
satellite parties were able to set up power structures across the state immediately
following this election, which was widely considered a sham, and by the time the
constitution was drawn in 1994, its loyal council approved every article of the new draft
constitution with minimal dissent (Gudina 2011:669).
Amidst this widespread ethnic manipulation and reorganization, the roots of later
political violence and oppression were implanted in the central political model. One of
the first acts of the post-revolutionary government was to reorganize Ethiopia under an
ethnic federalist system. The implementation of this system was reportedly an attempt to
address, redress, and minimalize historic violence; even the most staunchly nationalist
thinkers admit that the eras prior to the revolution were “audacious pretensions of empire
building, masquerading ‘modernization’ as social progress” (Zegeye 2017:280). The new
ethnic federal system sought to rectify this past division by establishing nine regions and
two special city zones, each “designated as the ethnic homelands of single ethnic groups
or combinations thereof” (Mozaffar & Scarritt 2007: 246). In theory this system
maintained some of the autonomy or self-actualization potential of each individual ethnic
group, while in practice it subjugated them to and unified them under the umbrella of
Ethiopia national identity (Semela 2012). Using ethnic federalism as a way to quell ethnic
tensions was described as a way of “maintaining unity” and “enhancing the political
participation” of the people (Aalen 2006:245).
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Political elites from Tigray and former EPRDF soldiers were able to manipulate
the circumstances by making a cautionary tale out of the historic power-hoarding of
Amhara elites, with whom the Dergue had become associated. Made explicit in the
country’s first charter was the prohibition of Amhara dominance, and nothing was said of
the Tigrayan people, who constituted a mere 6% of the population at the time (Keller
1995:630). During the Dergue rule, the Tigrayan people were described as not only “the
junior branch of the Abyssinian family, but also the poorest province” (Markakis
1989:124). In contrast, there is also reporting that the Tigrayan leadership strategically
manipulated foreign aid during a famine in the late 1980s as a way to “recruit displaced
and starving people to their military” (Dugassa 2016:182). Over time the TPLF involved
into an intimidating political force, identifiable from the other state-sponsored parties by
its staunch Orthodox Christian roots and values (Tadesse and Young 2003:395). These
same TPLF leaders ended state negotiations with their own Meles Zenawi as the face of
the emerging nation, and intended to leverage his international appeal to strengthen
Ethiopia’s image globally (Clapham 2009:183). This background provides important
insight into the reactionary nature of this “new” state, rechristened as the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The core values of hierarchal state rule entrenched in
conservative Orthodox Christianity which had guided Ethiopia throughout much of its
past were imbricated into legal and cultural norms. This hidden side of state formation
demonstrates the way other ethnic groups used their cultural background to increase their
own power at the expense of people like the Oromo. Mamdani describes these as tactics
used to stabilize and cement minority rule, by grounding culture “in a politically enforced
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system of ethnic pluralism… so that everyone, victims no less than beneficiaries, may
appear as minorities” (1996:6).
The new constitution and ethnic federal model also had important consequences
for the treatment of indigenous peoples in relation to land. It was prescribed that the right
to own land and all natural resources was exclusively the entitlement of the Ethiopian
state, which is permitted to lease it to private parties or relocate people despite any
adverse affects, with no requirement of informed consent (paraphrased Mesfin 2017:252).
These clauses serve to directly undermine the autonomy of the indigenous peoples whose
land was colonized by the Ethiopian state. This post-colonial condition allows for the
legalized oppression and recurring violence of the governing powers, as long as it is
properly justified by the neoliberal aims of the state (Donovan and Assefa 2003:506). As
a set of strategies, Meles’ preferred type of economic policy is better labeled as strategic
underdevelopment under the guise of neoliberal expansion (Ellison 2009). Ethiopia is
imagined as a “champion of the developmental state,” while engaging in land grabs and
privatization funded by foreign investors that serve to further oppress marginalized
peoples like the Oromo (Feyissa and Lawrence 2014:301). Furthermore, although the
governing framework allows for some regional autonomy, the majority of revenues are
still channeled to the federal government, who then provides grants and services (Aalen
2006:248). Thus the state continues to profit off of indigenous people and lifeways, as
with the exploitative coffee and tea plantations in West Oromiya, without fair or even
adequate compensation; all is done in the name of the nation. It is clear that the ethnic
federal model, even if run effectively, would do little to address the core injustices of the
Ethiopian settler state. However, under the rule of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi this
79

system was used as a tool for cultural imperialism, and neoliberal development that
exploited rural resources and ruined any real chance for indigenous autonomy. Leaders
who disagreed with Meles’ attempts at economic liberalism were sent back to local
parties in order to maintain this narrow vision (Clapham 2009:186).
Within these new state conditions, parts of Oromumma evolved both as a
response and as a form of resistance. The vast majority of Meles’ politicization tactics
were intended to maintain elite Habesha power, and push Ethiopia onto the global stage
as a modernized nation, whatever the cost. The elections he oversaw were described as
shams, with ruling parties taking home victories in the high 90th percentile (Gudina 2011;
Hagmann and Abbink 2011). Leading up to the 2005 elections Meles declared a ban on
“demonstrations and outdoor meetings,” law which critics charge was arbitrary,
subjective, and malleable at the hands of a violent state (Aalen 2006:252). More
specifically, the mention of “outdoor meetings” includes the traditional form of Oromo
gathering, a practice still used in smaller and rural communities. Gathering around the
Odaa tree is also a way to celebrate holidays or special events, and is still practiced by
Oromo people today. Thus Meles used Oromo culture as a means for limiting group
organization and attempts to fight back against state injustice. Following a near-loss in
2005 that led to mass protests, a further series of laws were enacted that prevented
protests and restricted freedom of speech— under the guise of an “Anti-terrorism
Proclamation” (Dugo 2016:398). Oromos and other ethnic groups were expected to be
appeased by the symbolism of the ethnic-based state parties, and thus ignore the
entrenched elitism and violence of these institutions, the laws restricting free speech, or
the problematic nature of the policies they presented (Dugassa 2016:189).
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One of the most problematic pieces was the focus on market expansion, despite
the costs. The EPRDF quickly “discarded the military regime’s [The Dergue] command
economy and announced a more free market-oriented policy” (Gudina 2011:664). Soon
after establishing state power, the Meles government began privatizing industries on a
broad scale starting with hotels and hospitality (Henze 2003:194). Despite receiving
increasing amounts of foreign investments as the government showed signs of stability,
the results were not spread equally across the country. Some sources suggest, and it is
popularly believed among rural Oromos, that this allocation was a form of punishment
for the revolutionary tendencies of the prior generation (Hassen 2002:37; Bassi and
Megerssa 2008:83). This is made more plausible by the direct connections between
former OLF strongholds and elites and the rates of deaths and disappearances in these
areas (Dugassa 2008:187).
Furthermore, although Ethiopia received high amounts of foreign aid, this money
was often directed towards “emergency assistance” and the government was notably
“adept at pursuing its interests and ideological commitments” within the bounds of
international relations (Clapham 2009:189). Underdevelopment as an Ethiopian state
practice seeks to exclude Oromo people from equitable presences in trade and the
economy, and is often justified in sociopolitical, legal, or even geographical terms. The
latter cause was used by Menelik to justify withholding aid, and this was also a partial
explanation for decreases in road density and political instability (Herbst 2000:166).
Whereas prior regimes would openly push Oromos to the margins of society for cultural
reasons, these seemingly apolitical actions still target specific pieces of Oromo identity,
and similarly serve to silence Oromo resistance. In discussing the difference between the
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EPRDF and past dictators, one exiled Oromo noted that while the Dergue killed with
impunity, “the Meles government kills and asks ‘who killed him?’ And then sets up an
inquiry commission” (Dugassa 2008:196). The tactics have not changed, only the
rhetorical framing.
While the drought of the early 2000s reportedly did similar damage across the
country, there is substantial evidence to support the idea that Meles distributed the vast
majority of the aid received to the Tigrayan province, even withholding fertilizer and
agricultural support from Southern people as a political tool to squash dissent (Ejara
2003; Dugassa 2008). The rule of Meles also saw an increase in the expropriation and
commercialization of indigenous land, both within and beyond Oromiya (Mesfin
2017:254). The year 2005 was the beginning of another resettlement campaign and
Tigrayan and Amhara settlers were given tracts of land in Gambella, bordering West
Oromiya (Lavers 2012; Mesfin 2017:255). These practices demonstrate a legally
enforced manipulation and politicization of people like the Oromo and the Gambella
through selective land use and forced relocations.
Meles employed many tactics of intentional disinformation and symbolic
manipulation in order to present and maintain certain state ideals, and this erasure and
rewriting continued after his untimely death. Although dying in Ethiopia at a state
hospital, there is a mythology around Meles’ death that leads in part to his continued
significance today. Popular rumor (across Ethiopia) suggests that soon before his death
Meles took a trip to Washington D.C. to conduct diplomatic relations. While greeting
members of the diaspora, someone from the crowd broke out and screamed that he was a
murderer, with Oromo blood on his hands (“Angry Ethiopians” 1997). Nationalistic
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Ethiopians insist that this moment haunted him, maybe even cursed him, and led to his
eventual death by heart attack. For Habesha elites, there was no way to comprehend a
country without own group at the top and simultaneously no reason to believe that
anyone could distrust this power. This lack of empathy and inability to compromise
would create the cracks that led to the destruction of Haile Selassie’s empire in 1974. The
Oromo people suffered and were silenced under Meles, and although this violence
continued throughout the reign of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, the next chosen
son of the EPRDF, the silencing of the Oromo resistance would not stand.

Section 7: #OromoProtests (2014- Present)
The Oromo Protest movement has been a key catalyst in creating the current
conditions and potential for positive change in Ethiopia. Although Oromo people fought
back and resisted throughout the Meles era, using a range of tactics, it was in the last
decade that the movement became more cohesive, effective, and unified. Since the start
of the #OromoProtests in spring of 2014, the Oromo people have maintained their
resistance against state violence by using their cultural traits to increase their access to
state rights and power, undermine neoliberal extraction, and reclaim the value of their
people. I use the phrase #OromoProtests with the hashtag (#) symbol to differentiate this
iteration of resistance from former protests. Oromo people have a rich history of
resistance, but it was during this particular set of protests that the Oromo people took
their movement online as well as to the streets. Members of the diaspora and those
Oromos with access to internet used the phrase to identify sites of resistance, celebrate
progress, highlight state violence, and reiterate the reason for the struggle: a free
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Oromiya. Thus this movement added a digital resistance front into its fight against the
state. As Fanon noted, “The rising generations are neither more flexible nor more tired
than those who launched the struggle,” and they continue to adapt to their circumstances
(1994:26).
During this era the Oromo began to more explicitly politicize their identity as a
means of resistance. After the death of Meles, the Ethiopian political elite and its
replacement puppet leader continued to push for its image as a stable economic power in
a troubled region, and neoliberal tendencies became firmly-embedded policies and
directives (Ellison 2009; Lavers 2012; Aalen 2014). The glossy face the regime
attempted to paint concealed but did nothing to address the growing disparities in wealth
and violations of human rights internally. These disparities, compounded by the political
inheritance of colonial relationships, would serve to trigger and justify continued protests.
The government’s violent and targeted response to each sign of insurrection is detailed at
length in Amnesty International’s 2014 report, “Because I Am Oromo.” These tactics
include the strategic disappearance of reported rebels and their family members, arbitrary
detention, sexual violence, and other horrific acts (Amnesty International 2014:56).
While this activity was kept mainly away from the public eye and international media,
the economic disparities during this era are not as easy to conceal. Examples of such stark
inequalities include the African Union compound, with its manicured grounds and
pristine green grass, which overlooks a neighborhood in Addis Ababa where the river
runs grey with trash, and the citizens still have no better way to wash their clothes. These
contrasts characterize the uneven growth practices of an oppressive neoliberal state; as
long as the markets report progress, the country is presumed by its leadership to be
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following suit. Interrogating the financial motivations of the state is a useful starting
point, but fully fleshing out the Oromo experience necessitates a closer analysis of the
state policies which allowed these ideologies to become actions.
Since its advent in the early 1990s, the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization
has been an essential piece of the state politicization process. Its role as an arbiter of
privilege and rights with a false Oromo-centric intent has deeply penetrated the daily
lives of Ethiopians even in the most rural areas. Its lack of authenticity is identifiable by
the limited number of Oromo leaders in the party who can speak Afan Oromo, among
other features. After a near loss in the 2005 elections, the government parties launched a
concurrent campaign to increase membership, “in some areas blatantly linking public
employment, promotion, and preferment to party membership” (Gudina 2011:673).
During my time in Ethiopia, I saw directly the infiltration of the OPDO into the education
system, utilizing economic rhetoric to encourage teachers to integrate pro-government
sentiment into their educational praxis. The OPDO would hold mandatory teacher
meetings throughout the school year regardless of the political climate, sometimes
closing school early to ensure teacher participation. The organization of these meetings is
a testament to the party’s illegitimacy and its deep disconnection from the local people,
as observable and noted by my colleagues and myself. Party leaders were unable to
complete even basic greetings in Afan Oromo, using an incorrect grammatical form to
address a group of people, smiling and unknowingly. Taking advantage of this fault,
teachers tended to ask questions in Afan Oromo, especially about more convoluted issues
like testing. This forced the party leader to rely on the school administrators for
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translation, or left him out of the conversation entirely. Seemingly innocent, these
actions were small but effective means of undermining the OPDO.
In general, the meetings I attended were not explicitly political in nature, and
tended to deal more with bureaucratic needs like school breaks, pay, and policies; some
were neighborhood or regional associations. However, following the upsurge in protests
in the spring of 2016, the government called in school administrators and teachers of
subjects like civics for mandatory education camps in places like Adama, an Oromo city
near the capital. During these programs participants sat in sessions for upwards of 10
hours daily learning about the necessity of organization, unity, and peace for
development (rhetoric discussed in Arriola and Lyons 2016). More specifically, these
lessons focused on providing methods to implant these ideals into the youth (specifically
student) population. Participants who I knew personally or heard of anecdotally had fairly
different reactions to these trainings, speaking to the divergent nature of politicization
within the country. Very few of the Oromo people in my extended network reported
positive reactions to the mandatory trainings, and those that did tended to be more
politically ambitious, Amharic-dominant, or Habesha-centric thinkers, and less attached
to their Oromumma. These few said they felt inspired and uplifted, ready to unite
Ethiopia despite the petty disagreements that were holding back progress. Many others
saw the content and nature of these trainings as a thinly veiled attempt to discourage
people from expressing just grievances and contestations against a violent state. Using
education as a way to frame narratives around organization and access to rights
demonstrates the way cultural prejudice is imbued into seemingly innocuous national
policies.
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In addition to its somewhat more mundane political programs, Ethiopia has also
continually used legal means to justify the oppressive politicization of the Oromo people.
A necropowerful state is an extreme form of state power that acts as a mechanism for
determining life and death itself while also seeking to stomp out any hopes of life despite.
The enacting of the 2016 State of Emergency in response to legitimate peaceful protests
is Ethiopia’s most egregious use of necropower in the modern era, a power that continues
to trouble Oromo struggles for survival, and only rarely allows for palpable change. The
extreme form of violent state oppression is still widely felt and understood as the
normative condition of Oromo life. It is a form of politicization because it uses laws in
order to delineate the conditions of existence; legally founded discrimination wherein the
consequence is death. At a basic level, understanding necropower necessitates
constructing a narrative based on statistics and figures. The number of lives lost during
the Irreecha and Chalanqo Massacres, the number of citizens disappeared during a regime
of terror, the military budget (fortified and supported by outside forces under the guise of
foreign aid) of the Ethiopian state; these mechanisms construct a necropolitical force in a
quantifiable and transmittable way. The Irreecha Massacre killed anywhere from 50-100
people in a single day, depending on which source you trust, and deaths of student
protestors at the primary-school level were frequently reported throughout 2014-2017
(Human Rights Watch 2015; ACLED 2016:53; Carboni 2016; Borkena 2017; Zelalem
2017). Even these supporting facts are shadowy, and the challenge in seeking accurate
counts contributes to the fear-based nature of this system. However, a full understanding
of the necropowerful state requires an attention to the reverberating impacts of this death,
and the constant fear of more death, and the way that this haunts and defines the nature of
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group identity and existence. When the Ethiopian state declared a national emergency
in response to mass protests, it was the very presence of the Oromo that was designated
kill-able, and the security of the entire nation that was deemed a threat.
One of the most effective means of implementing Ethiopia’s necropower is the
Agazi and Liyu Special Police, the Tigrayan-led elite units, identifiable by their red
berets. Since the rise of the Oromo Protests as an organized movement, the Agazi have
played an increasing role in enforcing Ethiopia’s state power (Dugo 2016:397). In order
to contextualize the power of the Agazi, and the way they demonstrate a necropowerful
state, I will provide a brief example of one of my experiences with them. The year 2016
was one of the bloodiest eras in Ethiopia’s recent memory. The Armed Conflict Location
and Event Data Project trend reports from this year described at least 50 deaths a month
across the country beginning in January, many the result of government-sponsored
clashes (ACLED 2016:48 and 53). The Oromo Protest movement that had grown rapidly
during the fall of 2015 was maintaining pressure, getting more organized, and refusing to
be silenced. Separate issues over territory and ethnicity in the northern part of the country
had brought to light the depths of the nepotism, corruption, and elitism in the Ethiopian
ruling class. The necropower of the Ethiopian political force was quickly becoming a
looming presence in village, town, and in households across the country. The Agazi were
deployed hundreds of miles from the capital city, while being granted increasing amounts
of autonomy, despite the fact that they were essentially seen as foreigners, speaking little
to none of the local languages and coming through towns in massive tanks and
camouflaged trucks.
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It was during this time that the potential of Ethiopia’s necropower first became
personal. A scuffle between two students in the school where I taught had led to a broken
window; one boy was named the perpetrator and taken to the county jail. This was spring
of 2016, and reports of Oromo youth “disappearing” from jail, and being subjected to
beatings and torture were widespread, if unconfirmed. The students in my school reacted
to his incarceration by protesting, leaving campus two days in a row as a large group with
their arms crossed above their heads. This is the gesture of the Oromo protest movement,
a symbol of arms locked up, chained by the state. They shouted two things over and
again, “Ararso, Ararso, ijoollee gaddississaa” and “Haadhi Oromiya nutti gaddississaa;”
Ararso, (the name of the local police chief) Ararso release the children, Mother Oromiya
release us. The next day, the Agazi showed up.
They pulled up in a pick-up truck, three Agazi soldiers in the front, five in the
back. All were armed, and identifiable by their red berets. Mounted on the floor of the
trunk were sniper rifles, facing in opposite directions. The high school in the town I
worked in is located on the edge of picturesque cliff, overlooking endless mountains,
jungle, and a verdant sea in every direction. On a foggy day the peak it rests on sits above
the clouds, seeming to float over them. The only way out is up a single road, sloppily
paved by jagged cobblestones leftover from the Italian occupation.
To understand the power of this panopticon, place yourself in the Agazis’
position: parked sideways across the single road, armed and mounted, staring down the
barrel of a gun into the eyes of hundreds of enemy soldiers in-the-making. They stopped
being students, children, when they raised their voice in the wrong direction, raised their
arms and crossed their wrists. To understand the horror of the panopticon, place yourself
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in the students’ position: locked in an institution that is supposed to be building,
nurturing, and educating you, surrounded by danger on all sides; staring up the barrel of a
government-sponsored gun. You stopped feeling safe the minute your schoolmate was
swept off to jail. On that day, I sat across the street from the truck, peering out a window
with everyone else, horrified. I saw firsthand the potential violence of necrotic power. On
the next day, I sat with my students within those same walls and same buildings, and tried
to turn an English class into a form of escapism. I don’t remember what we talked about.
Far from being an isolated incident, the deployment of federal police and Special
Forces became normalized both before and during subsequent State of Emergency
declarations. Evidence of this deployment comes primarily from firsthand witness
account, and limited reporting available via social media. Reports from activist Girma
Gutema, posting from Hararge and other Oromo cities, shows proof of Agazi violence
stretching through to the end of 20171. While denying it at the time, by the end of 2017 as
the rule of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn became increasingly untenable, the
government admitted that at times “members of the federal police and the defense forces
were deployed to restore peace in the institutions,” including colleges and universities 2.
Reports by outside analysts suggest that at the end of 2017 roughly 50% of violent
conflicts involved either federal or state security military and police forces, and of that
around 30% were the actions of elite special police (Burchard 2017:3). As one jailed
opposition leader said during his sham hearing in federal court: “You smell of blood. For
1

Girma Gutema’s Twitter page (@Abbaacabsa), accessed March 1 2019,
https://twitter.com/Abbaacabsa/status/941680825317421056
2

Addis Standard, via twitter (@addisstandard), accessed March 1, 2019,
https://twitter.com/addisstandard/status/941224076575760386
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26 years you’ve (wrongly convinced [sic] and) killed the Oromo people; for 26 years,
you’ve been drenched by the blood of the Ethiopian people.”1 When Oromo people took
to the streets to protest during the State of Emergency, especially in large college towns,
they chanted “Down, Down, Woyane,” a reference to the Tigrayan elites who attempted
to initiate a rebellion during the Haile Selassie era (Zegeye 2017:281; personal
observation). That this slogan, rather than an explicitly anti-government sentiment, was
chosen, points to the Oromos’ perceptions of real government power, and the legacy that
the Tigrayan people had embedded into the state shape.
The necropowerful state need not actualize its violence. It is the ever-hanging
threat in the air, the deeply ingrained knowledge that an Oromo life could disappear and
not be counted. Children felt it, heard it, repeated it, shaped their entire worldviews
around it. My friend’s five-year-old child, when asked where he wants to attend college,
tells me that he can’t go because “they kill Oromos there.” Necropolitics needs to be
understood for its impact on the psyche as much as the corporeal harm it enacts. What
Mbembé calls the “state of exception” takes place in the Ethiopian context as a state of
emergency, and an emergency seems to creep around every corner (2003:12). The Oromo
Protest movement did not begin when the hashtag first hit the internet. The roots of the
resistance can be found as far back as the era of Kings and Emperors. As a model for
non-state sovereignty, organizing around Oromumma has proven to be an effective tactic.
Through their continued resistance and response to state tyranny, the #OromoProtests
successfully interrupted economic and social life to the point that they could no longer be
1

Mohamed Ademo, via Twitter (@Opride), accessed on March 2019,
https://twitter.com/OPride/status/951491391498137600
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ignored. The most radical tactics were their striking and nonviolent protests, which
demonstrated the effectiveness of the core Oromo values of community and peace, as a
way of resisting state violence.
The Oromo resistance, both formally and informally, has employed a number of
nonviolent resistance tactics, but its most prominent or effective moments have been its
attempts to communicate with wider audiences by employing symbolic public acts such
as the display of flags, gestures, and mass action. Oromos work within the means given to
them to share their message with the public, despite a lack of access to spaces of mass
communication outside of the diaspora community. This is particularly true of the runner
Feyisa Lilesa’s protest during the Rio Olympics in 2016. Lilesa garnered the first real
international attention for the Oromo cause, finally bringing the protests that had been
taking place across the country for over two years to a global stage. During the last few
meters of his silver medal performance in the Olympic Marathon, Lilesa lifted his arms
above his head and crossed them at the wrists. This gesture is symbolic of the Oromo
struggle in a very visceral way; the gesturer appears to be chained up at the wrists, locked
together like a prisoner, the same way the Oromo people have been locked down and
restricted by the Ethiopian state. This action was both incredibly brave, and incredibly
dangerous. As Lilesa himself recounts, he knew that this was not merely a cry for help, it
was also a sentencing; he may never get to see his country again (2017). This gesture,
made illegal by the Ethiopian government’s State of Emergency policies, finally triggered
international conversations about the Oromo condition.
On a more local scale, the Oromo resistance began employing stay-at-home
strikes during the spring of 2017, after the first State of Emergency had been lifted, The
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decision to strike is typically spread among members of the resistance by way of social
media when it is available, and more generally by word of mouth or informal
communication networks. During these strikes Oromo students, workers, and business
owners refuse to work or learn. Businesses are shuttered, schools are open but not
attended, and government employees stay home. Sometimes during these strike periods,
members of the resistance will take a more active stance and block roads as a deterrent to
those who would break the strike. The key impact of the stay-at-home strikes is a
demonstration of the strength of Oromo social power. While they have been
systematically denied access to political power or military might, the Oromo people have
fought on. By employing a stay-at-home strike, the Oromo people are clearly
demonstrating to the government the impact that they have on the economy. Doing so
also reiterates this message to the Oromo people, and highlights the strength they have
has a community. Any attempt to interfere with economic progress is particularly
threatening to the ruling class, who have long attempted to use the rhetoric of “peace for
development” to quell uprisings.
Each of these tactics differs in its scope, publicity, and effectiveness. However
what makes this era unique in the history of the Oromo is the strategic decision to use
Oromo culture as the catalyst through which to decolonize the Ethiopian state. Although
the Oromo have long resisted oppressive violence, they formerly relied on reactionary
tactics to achieve radical ends, appealing for freedom from colonial tyranny to European
colonial empires, or creating rebel military groups to fight internationally-funded militias.
These campaigns failed to achieve significant results because they lacked the decolonial
imagination necessary to see a sovereignty beyond Ethiopian nation-state lines. The
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current #OromoProtests make it clear that the Oromo will no longer be denied access to
rights, power, and a public voice, and when the state is unwilling or unable to provide
this space they will create it.

Conclusion
Throughout the history of the Oromo people in the Horn of Africa, the Ethiopian
state has been a source of violent oppression, manipulative governance, and exploitation
against them. Recognizing this history and legitimizing these challenges is part of the
process of resisting the future violence of this nation-state. Furthermore, identifying
Oromo practices of resistance within and despite Ethiopia is only possible with a clear
comprehension of what they are working against. This chapter has aimed to address my
first research question, looking at the way Oromumma has been politicized over time, as
drawing on a careful analysis of literature and my personal observations. The following
chapter will explore the way this politicization and the nature of these relationships are
understood by Oromo people living in the diaspora.
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CHAPTER V: KEY THEMES AND FINDINGS
Introduction
This chapter describes and organizes the main ideas and themes that emerged
during the interview process. They provide an answer to the research question: What
factors have most influenced Oromumma in the diaspora? In order to understand how
members of the Oromo diaspora understand and define the nature of their politicization, I
asked questions about their histories, and the way they had experienced Oromo-Ethiopia
relations. Their answers were coded for examples of economic, political, and cultural
phenomena. This process is explained in Chapter III. At the end of each section I present
Organizing Themes that unite and make sense of the responses within each section of
codes.

Economic Politicization
Becoming the Gabbar
In the economic domain, one of the most consistently described abuses of the
Oromo people was the exploitation of the Oromo homeland and the Ethiopian state’s
practice of withholding profits from Oromo people. Each era of Ethiopian governance
brought with it certain forms of exploitation. Notable however was the way that
participants across demographics described similarly the ways in which their homeland
and their bodies were viewed by the state only in terms of economic production. The era
of Haile Selassie and the Nafxanya-Gabbar system had particular impacts on the Oromos’
economic position. It was during this era that a common expression, which also neatly
sums up the nature of state relations, was “One Amhara person should have two Oromo
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slaves,” as Gifti shared. As a state-sponsored economic system, this meant completely
rearranging social relationships, as well as relationships to the land. Ebba, now in his late
40s and born at the end of the Selassie era in Western Wellega, describes his experiences
growing up:
Oromos who participated in the war [against the Italians] when they come
back to their country…the northern regions [Habesha elites] they came,
and they took over their land. And the Oromos who had been there, it
doesn’t matter… you lose your land. Those people by the name of heroes,
they come and conquer, they take over your land, and you become the
Gabbar.
By “becom[ing] the Gabbar,” Ebba means that the Oromo people went from free
landowners to tenants and laborers, forced to pay rent and give contributions to Habesha
elites and the favored friends of Emperor Selassie. This policy disrupted Oromo religious
practices and agricultural land use, while also legitimizing the exploitative economic
tactics of the Ethiopian state. Although only two of the interview participants lived
through the Nafxanya-Gabbar system of feudal land control in their teenage years, the
ideologies necessary to implement it remained present and influential in current
narratives.
When describing the way the Ethiopian state treated Oromo people, the
respondents explicitly noted its commoditizing tendencies: “they just use Oromiya as a
resource center but they don't invest back on it” as Chalchissa said, similar to Ebba’s
view that “they only use you to farm and field you, to pay rent on the land.” Oromo
people were stuck in exploitative roles that never rewarded or acknowledged their labor
or their historic relationships to the land. Even Sanyii, only six weeks into his life in
America and born in the early 1990s, during the current EPRDF system, understood and
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had witnessed exploitation by state elites: “Those people from Addis, from anywhere,
they buy products from Oromo people with cheap money and they sell it for expensive
money [sic].” By taking advantage of the resources, fertile land, and bodies of the Oromo
people, state elites profit off and exploit the Oromo.
In cases where the Ethiopian government could not legally separate Oromos from
their homeland nor effectively profit off of them, the state has proceeded to marginalize
and exclude Oromos from accessing the benefits of their land and labor; in many ways
the economic wishes of elites would be better filled if Oromos simply died. This
understanding was echoed by participants across the group. Gifti, born in North Showa
during the Dergue era, stated it the most pointedly, “There was a time when you were not
even allowed to live anywhere, as if you were not even born on this planet.” This mirrors
Ebba’s description, as the farmland his family had lived on for generations was given to
Northern settlers. When respondents discussed the marginalizing tactics of the Ethiopian
state in terms of land, urban development was a common issue. Chalchissa notes that one
of the perceived motivations behind the government’s forcible implementation of the
Master Plan was that the state elites
Wanted to add and pile up the land they had, just to make a lot of profits.
And they wanted to take Finfinnee or the capital city out of Oromiya and
wanted it to be a region by itself, and then Oromiya wouldn’t benefit from
any income that Finfinnee generates.
This attempted remapping demonstrates the way elites exclude Others from joining the
upper class. A Finfinnee that is legally separated from Oromiya would not have any
connection to the Oromo people or language. This system allows for elites to maintain
control and continue to marginalize the masses.
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In every aspect, the economic benefit that Finfinnee produces is both withheld
from Oromiya as a region, and from Oromos specifically. Many participants discussed
how hotels, shopping centers, and other modern businesses were exclusively owned by
Tigrayans. Chalchissa, who was born in East Wollega at the end of the Dergue regime, in
the 1980s, explained at length:
Starting from the whole income generating thing all the way out to
electronics. That import, export, you know, they’re all in control by the
Tigrayans… If you go to Finfinnee now and if you go down Bole, which
is the most expensive part of the city, there are so many hotels, and almost
all of those hotels are owned by the Tigrayans.
Chalchissa was not alone in his description of these economic disparities. Many
participants described the way only Northern elites had access to modern industry. Abdi
describes all of these new developments and selective modernization as “a kind of
colonial project that is for the economy to amass money, and send out, and to finance the
development of Tigray.” Finfinnee’s land is given to Tigrayan business owners who
develop it, modernize it, use the space to set up international trade, and funnel the
benefits only back to the North, or their own pockets. This elite ownership was identified
by respondents in each major industry: technology, natural resources, and trade in general
were all described as Northern-owned. When explaining the Addis Ababa Master Plan,
Bontu, who grew up in the 1960s in Illubabor, immediately identified the underlying
ethnic base: “All these rich people, they are not Oromo. They are maybe Tigray people,
or maybe Amhara, and they are just like moving the population of Oromo all the time.”
This strategy enforces the economic dominance of the few at the expense of the Oromo.
Over time, the exploitation of Finfinnee by government elites, and “Northerners”
in particular, became increasingly untenable because, as Gifti explained; “The land in
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Finfinnee, or Addis, is getting smaller and smaller by day because all these rich people
from the north wanted more land, and the profit you get from land is enormous.” As the
land “got smaller,” the limits of exploitation began to stagnate, and the government’s
response was to forcibly evict Oromo people from the surrounding areas to allow the
continuance of profit. This economic strategy demonstrates the prioritization of profit
over people, as well as giving proof of the influence of elites in state institutions, with
economic consequences.
In addition to the elites’ chokehold on economic power in the capital city, the
marginalization of the Oromo people through exclusionary tactics was described as a
national, systematic issue. Badhaassaa, coming from Bale Region and raised during the
Dergue era of the late 1980s, when asked about Oromo’s access to work and jobs, said:
“If you get a job you’re not promoted to high position, to lead or something. It doesn’t
matter. Regardless of your success or how much activity or productive you could be, they
don’t allow you.” In this description, the “they” indicates Habesha elites, referred to also
as “Northerners,” who are described as having monopolies on power and business across
the country. Sanyii made his opinion much more explicit: “It was only Tigrayans who
had a chance to work and some big companies. Oromos were denied of the right to work
with them because even though we are hired we might do bad things… we didn't have
equal chance.” In this specific example, elite ideologies have embedded themselves into
business practices and are used to permit Oromo exclusion.
Marginalization has generational impacts on the people it oppresses. Biiftu
examined the results of this strategy closely: “You don't find Oromo real estate owner,
Oromo investor, you don't find a lot of those people, because politically and financially
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they are marginalized. In that way, the community has nobody to look up to.” A key
point is made clear here: no promise of economic change will have a meaningful impact
unless it addresses the generational disadvantages of the previous systems. However, no
participants shared a genuine hope for or belief in the possibility for change emerging
from the economic domain. The market-driven nature of the state is demonstrated in the
way investment is pumped into Oromiya but never returned to Oromo people, as
Badhaassaa shared: “There is no service that is designed or planned from the government
to serve those areas [rural Oromiya]. All that what they care is they care for the resources.
That's it.” These feudal, post-colonial, and now increasingly neoliberal actions and
policies have irrevocably changed the way ethnic groups relate to each other within the
Ethiopian state. Both marginalization and exploitation were implemented to specifically
benefit Tigrayan elites, and these effects are felt and identified by the Oromo generations
after.

Organizing Themes
Within the economic domain, a few organizing themes emerge. These are
displayed on page 102 as Figure 5.1. The key Organizing Theme, which unites the others,
is that the Ethiopian state has sought to commoditize all social relationships. This
commodification, most saliently between the Oromo people and their homeland, has
become a foundational piece of the state and the way it relates to its subjects. The elites
frame the place of the Oromo only in terms of their economic benefit. Under the
Nafxanya-Gabbar system, vast areas of land that were once the Oromo people’s home
were populated by settler colonial cities and resettled Northerners. Although the system
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has formally ended, the cities and populations created as a result of it remain. Through
these re-mappings, Oromo people are forced to stay the Gabbar, the second Economic
Organizing Theme.
By staying the Gabbar, I suggest that even though the post-colonial state has
eliminated the feudal labor system, its impact has done permanent damage to Oromo
futures. Oromo people, though no longer slaves, still do not live freely on their historic
homeland. Ayantu described this ongoing exclusion: “This is the issue of Oromos today,
as yesterday. The struggle for the land still continues. People do not own the land.” This
profiteering serves to keep power and control in the hands of elites, who force Oromo
people to the margins of society and deny their economic advancement. Biiftu, also
quoted earlier, clearly described Oromos exclusion from real estate and land ownership
as an example of Oromo people being “politically and financially… marginalized.” This
marginalization characterizes the place of the Oromo within the city. However, the
economic practices of Ethiopian elites were also impactful in the design and structure
Ethiopian cities. This is demonstrated by the third Economic Theme.
Finfinnee, known internationally as Addis Ababa, exemplifies the commoditizing
and extractive tactics of the state, described as the manipulation of Finfinnee. Formerly
the heart of the Oromo homeland, Finfinnee is now the site of Tigrayan-owned condos
and never-ending construction projects. Chalchissa explained that “The economy is
mainly controlled by the political elites from the north, the Tigrayans, so not many
Oromos can find that financial strength.” The control of an Oromo city by Northerners in
a way that denies Oromo existence echoes the treatment of the Oromo under the feudal
system. As the hub and metropole of the post-colonial state, Finfinnee has lost any
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connection to Oromiya, and become the property of greedy elites. The Oromo people
do not see the results of Finfinnee’s profit and are excluded from accessing these
benefits; “even if they live there they're just doing the low class, they just take any type
of low level of job,” as Ebba explains. The geographic location of Finfinnee, in the center
of Oromiya, and its access to Oromo goods and labor do not mean that these
opportunities actually support Oromo people. Instead, as Sanyii shared, “Even though the
resources, everything is from Oromo region, from Oromos, still they [Northern elites]
don’t appreciate.”
The liberation of Finfinnee from this system would require a radical re-imagining
of the entire economic model that allowed for this marginalization to become
institutionalized. If Finfinnee were to be a city that gives back to and sustains those who
live there, or a city whose cultural heritage plays a part in determining its future, hope for
an economic resistance may be a more realistic possibility. This, however, is not the case,
and this version of Finfinnee only exists in speculation and dreams. As a set of
Organizing Themes, we can understand the economic relationships to be uneven,
exploitative, and contributing to Oromo oppression. There was little suggestion of Oromo
resistance in the economic domain in the lived experiences of my participants.
Staying the
Gabbar
• Permanent
displaceme
nt from
access

Ethiopia has
commoditized all
relationships

Manipulation of
Finfinnee
• An Oromo city that
doesn't benefit the
Oromo people

FIGURE 5.1: Organizing Theme- Economic
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Political Politicization
One Country in the Sky Above Us All
The Ethiopian state has used subordinating tactics to prevent Oromo people from
gaining or accessing political power since its initial formation. When exclusion and
strategic underdevelopment were not enough to maintain elite power, the government
turned to necropower, killing and using the threat of death to control the population. In
response to these types of violence, the Oromo people have reorganized and found forms
of sovereignty that function outside of the state model. The presence of these phenomena
shed light on the way that the state has used law and legality to restrict Oromo futures, as
well as the way the Oromo people interviewed for this project have used the strength of
their culture to undermine oppressive state formations and imagine alternate models.
Many participants spoke openly about the violent political strategies employed by the
state. As Ayantu, born in the early 1970s in Bedele Region, described: “There are two
differences within one country… two different kinds of citizens, actually. The northern
part… Amhara and Tigrayans. And the others, which is western, southern... The Oromos
and all other tribes are kind of second level citizen.”
First-level citizens are the only ones allowed access to a harm-free Ethiopian state
system. In a more poetic portrayal, Tolera explains that when it comes to Habeshas and
the state, “They are one country in the sky above us all. The rest of the people are in a
hole.” Both of these acknowledgements and experiences demonstrate the way
subordinating political practices have been embedded into the system of governance.
More specifically, education and access to resources were the most commonly shared
strategies of state subordination, and will be discussed further here.
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Limiting access to education is one key mechanism through which the Ethiopian
state has kept Oromo people subordinate. My participants both alluded to challenges in
access, and spoke about them outright. Obsee, who grew up in the western part of the
country in the late 1980s and 1990s, explained her experiences: “He [the government]
don't want the Oromo people to organize… he knows if they get education they are going
to learn they were treated in a bad way, that they don't have anything or any rights.”
Specific examples of restrictions placed on educational access include the bans placed on
Afan Oromo in schools and the generational disparities in literacy this has produced, as
well as a lack of infrastructure necessary to attend schools, including unavailable or
unpaved roads. Participants from all eras, genders, and religions spoke similarly of the
hindrances to their educational achievement. Abdi explained that the “government was
sabotaging the Oromo’s education. They don’t want us to come to knowledge.” The
government system was portrayed as working against Oromo education from every angle.
State subordination was similarly enacted through other institutions.
Discriminatory access to equal rights was also embedded in the legal system,
where linguistic discrimination was mandated; all legal proceedings were historically
held in Amharic. Wayissa recalled that throughout the Dergue era and into the EPRDF
years, “This court could be Oromo, but he's not allowed to hear you speak in Oromo. He
wouldn't let you speak in your own language, even though he can understand. That’s how
much the Oromos were excluded.” Although Afan Oromo is now a legally recognized
language, rural Oromo people who travel to major cities like Finfinnee to contest land
grabs in court may struggle to find an Oromo interpreter. Thus legal policies and tactics
continue to allow the Ethiopian state to suppress Oromos’ ability to get fair access to
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rights. Discussed more extensively by the participants was the extreme end on the
spectrum of state control: the state’s deployment of necropower against the Oromo.
The necropowerful potential of the state was activated in two ways: through
narrative creation that justifies the death and over-policing of Oromo people, and open,
large-scale violence. The educational system’s treatment of the Oromo people has
vacillated between erasure and demonization, both of which play a key role in justifying
violence. Erasure permits destruction, but threats of violence against the state permit and
beget violence. Unanswered demands for more representation in state systems have
allowed for Ethiopian elites to deny the positive contributions of Oromo people over
time. Silence is a drastic difference from the state’s typical treatment of Oromo people, as
Bontu notes: “They’ll say they [Oromos] are criminals who tried to overcome, to
overthrow the government and take power. They will teach you someone bad, like
terrorist… they tell you that they’re trying to kill the Amhara people, that's what they
teach.” This framing of the Oromo as inherently against the Ethiopian state project, and
in need of taming, is a necessary piece of the violent Othering and suppression of Oromo
existence. It is these types of ideologies that are responsible for the waves of mass
imprisonment against the Oromo. Ebba described the set of circumstances that led to his
escape from Ethiopia in the early 1990s, as a direct result of this construct:
As soon as they [the EPRDF] came in they just put me in jail. There is no
reason, just because I am Oromo…. I wasn't supporting anyone, but
automatically they decide I am supporting OLF and they put me in jail.
When I came out, they came after me again. They were trying to recruit
me. I refused. And then finally they gave me a warning… that if I don’t be
with them [the EPRDF] then there is a chance of going back to jail again.
Rather than face this cycle of imprisonment, he escaped. It is important to remember,
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here, the notoriety of policing and prisons throughout Ethiopian history. Documents
over the past two decades include extensive reporting of this violence, detailing
disappearances, starvation, and torture in state prisons (Hassen 2002; Amnesty
International 2014; Africa Research Bulletin 2016). A jail sentence could just as likely
mean a death sentence, and the only necessary justification was a trace of Oromumma.
Wayissa spoke with candor about his experience in prison:
They took us to this remote area they detained us there for almost like a
year. Torturing, doing all these kind of bad stuff in that detention center...
They have done all like the bad things human beings can do.
This type of incident, far from being isolated, was reflected on openly by several
participants, while others alluded to stories, rumors, and memories they did not want to
elaborate on. The general portrayal was that the imprisonment of Oromo people also had
deathly consequences.
Biiftu, growing up in Illubabor at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, described
this era similarly, though she was much younger at the time. As an elementary school
student, she recalls, “we were in a time where being Oromo was considered a crime by
itself. And that was part of that regime.” The criminalization of Oromo identity was
necessary to justify further oppression and violence, and was found across institutions,
with consequences that damaged Oromo identity as well as Oromo bodies. Each of the
participants who lived under Haile Selassie’s educational system shared similar stories of
ostracism targeting their language and culture: being forced to change their name and
language to get through these institutions without harm. Abdi, who left the country at the
end of the Selassie era in the early 1970s, traces the formation of resistance movements
directly to this harmful educational system: “Their [Oromo resistance organizations]
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demand was land rights and education, access to knowledge. And many of them died,
were massacred. And the massacres still, until last year it didn’t stop.” In a direct,
physical way, being Oromo was a punishable offense, and attempts to organize around
this were some of the most egregious offenses. The Irreecha massacre, remembered sadly
by many participants, is the most egregious example of this in recent history. In a single
day, dozens of Oromos were killed, and the government has yet to fully acknowledge or
make amends for this violence. Ethiopia’s use of death and the threat of more death to
enact state rule was a consistent theme from the interviews, across political experiences.
When asked about the government’s response to the Oromo protests, compared to
the other examples of government oppression, participants spoke of the deadly nature of
state governance. As Chalchissa stated:
I wish sometimes it was a fight between two military groups. It was just
the government, a lunatic government, against innocent people, innocent
civilians who are asking for representation in the government, who want
their culture to be entertained in the country, who want their identity also
to be seen.
This “lunatic” government is well armed, well funded, and notoriously violent. Speaking
to the same question, Tolera responded, “The way the government had been handling all
these questions… was through bullets.” The Ethiopian state’s use of force to maintain
state rule is clearly understood by Oromo people. The narratives of “violent Oromos” and
future terrorists that defined the educational system contradict sharply with the historical
relations between Oromo people and the state that colonized them. This is made more
evident the more Oromo history is given proper attention and analysis. The ideology of
violence by a state which seeks to justify its use of necropower is hypocritical, and the
Oromo people feel this hypocrisy. As Obsee explained: “They say 'oh everybody has a
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right to exercise… to speak his language, to write in his language’ but when they see
writing [in Afan Oromo] they either kill you or you have to leave that country or they put
you in jail.” These experiences illustrate how the Ethiopian state criminalizes and then
kills Oromo identity.

Political resistance: sovereignty gone underground
Despite this extensive violence, the Oromo people I interviewed identified
practices of freedom and resistance that exist outside of the state. These examples of nonstate organization demonstrate a healing potential that speaks to Oromo history and
futures. Although a few participants mentioned the Macha Tulama and its work, it was
the OLF who truly captured the resistance spirit of the Oromo. Their origins were spoken
of highly, as Ayantu remembers from her childhood “The OLF was fighting for many
years… educating the Oromos about our rights, about everything, the politics, our
history, our culture.” Creating alternate institutions that serve and meet the needs of the
people is an example of non-state organization. This was a common practice of the OLF,
and was identified by participants as one reason the Ethiopian state could not tolerate
their existence.
Badhaassaa, like many other participants, blamed the removal of the OLF from
state politics on the EPRDF, who “stopped the organization [the OLF] and they banned
the organization simply because they wanted to make roads and clinics in the Oromo
region.” This explanation contrasts directly with the justifications provided by the
Ethiopian state, which has long accused the OLF of violence. The illegality of the OLF,
however, did not diminish their power and prevalence in Oromo communities. The
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legacy of their organizing, and the unified Oromo identity they promote, is seen in the
rhetoric used by respondents. Chalchissa lamented, “If the Oromos, all the Oromos knew
what they know right now, any government wouldn't exist or survive for a long time. But
back then, even the Oromos were not aware of who they are or what OLF means for
them.” The OLF has long functioned as an alternate model to the Ethiopian state, with a
reimagined sovereignty. As more Oromo people become aware of the real possibility for
resisting state violence, the perception of the OLF in the Oromo cultural consciousness is
elevated and strengthened. It is also important to add that the current moment in
Ethiopian politics (particularly the existence of an Oromo Prime Minister and the re-entry
of the OLF) is being watched closely by all Oromos. The coming election, which has yet
to be officially scheduled, its legitimacy, and the nature of OLF participation are an
opportunity to change the future of Ethiopian politics in a real way. A re-established OLF
competing in a fair election could change the face of state relations.
Using cultural knowledge and traits to organize and practice a non-state
sovereignty was a key aspect of both national and international resistance. The OLF
organized Oromo people across Oromiya, and in doing so also served as an example for
radical sovereignty as they left the metropole and started “establishing themselves
underground,” as Ebba explained. OLF base camps were exiled to Somalia and Eritrea
until very recently, with only a few scattered groups in the deep Northwest and Southeast
parts of Oromiya maintaining a presence. However, the fear of their existence and return
has long motivated Ethiopian state action. I identify this resilience and the recognition of
this resistance force as a type of sovereignty because it legitimizes the political power and
sway of the Oromo people, despite existing outside of state boundaries. This, in many
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ways, is sovereignty of the soul, a way of keeping your community alive. As Sanyii
notes, “They are afraid of Oromo because they [Oromo people] are dying, and still they
[the protests] are not stopping.” Oromo people are asserting their claim over their future,
despite the violence.
Also threaded throughout descriptions of Oromo resistance were the ways in
which the diaspora itself allowed Oromo people to counteract and fight back. Technology
is one key piece of this: “Before they were still killing, but now it is on social media, on
internet, on everything. People on Congress, the U.S. government, U.S. president,
worldwide they see,” Bontu explained. The diaspora makes the Oromo struggle more
visible and puts it in closer contact with those who have the power to make change. This
expansion changes the face of the Oromo resistance. In the early years, diaspora
formation was a more reactionary process, as Wayissa explains: “There is a time when
you cannot take it any more so then you either go and join this group [the OLF] or leave
the country.” Compared to the radical action of the OLF, entering the diaspora and its
exile was seen as a back-up option, or weaker alternative. However, as the technological
capabilities and organization of the diaspora have advanced over time, the potential
resistance power of the diaspora has also grown. While the OLF has now re-entered the
national mainstream, and will almost certainly be allowed to field candidates in the next
election, it has also demonstrated its sovereignty and resistance potential outside of the
state for decades.

Organizing Themes
As a domain of politicization the political project can often be the broadest
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reaching, because it is enacted through law and policy, as well as control of state
institutions. Organizing Themes that emerged from participants’ discussions of the state
project demonstrate both the legacy of the settler colonial state, and the way Oromo
resistance has learned to grow around, despite, and beneath this construct. By taking the
land from its original owners, settling and then resettling it with outside people and
imposing a violent education system, the Ethiopian state reveals itself to be a Habesha
settler colony, the broadest Organizing Theme. Examples of the colonial nature of the
Ethiopian state were prevalent. This “citizenship in the sky” is only accessible to elites,
and marked by hypocrisy. Obsee gives an example of the capital city, where the settler
ideologies are strongest “The northern party are still complaining Finfinnee doesn’t
belong to Oromo. Whereas Finfinnee is at the center of Oromo, I don't know what else
they can think.” Recognizing this makes clear the way this project was both embedded
into education and characterized by the idea of a “citizenship in the sky.” The language
of this latter theme, taken directly from an interview, paints a clear picture of what life
under this state is like for non-elites, and highlights the oppressive tendencies of the state.
Understanding the way education has enacted and supported this project makes clear the
permissibility of other forms of violence. These are two tools of the settler colony which
were also features of the Oromo resistance project.
The concept of the “citizenship in the sky” is a way of describing the clear
disparities in rights and access provided by the state. As Biiftu declared, “If one is in
upper position and one is like lower position, it's not gonna work… First-class Ethiopian,
second-class Ethiopian, that's what I'm having a hard problem with.” She was not alone
in this frustration. Participants spoke at length about these gaps, and their difficulty in
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overcoming them. First-class Ethiopians were consistently the Northerners, Habesha,
Tigrayan, Amharic-speakers; the same elites in every institution. Oromo people often
faced a difficult choice, as Tolera explains: “If they [Oromos] play into their [Habesha]
benefit or into their ideologies then they are part of Ethiopian culture. If they don’t, then
they don't write their culture or their history.” The latter choice, to refuse assimilation,
results in parts of the country where “Oromos were really neglected and basically
abandoned,” as Gifti notes. This conditional citizenship results in clear differences in the
lived experiences under the Ethiopian state.
As is the case with the hierarchal nature of citizenship, education was a way to
perpetuate anti-Oromo narratives and maintain Oromo oppression, and was central to
maintaining the legitimacy of the settler colonial system. Even accessing education was
politicized, as was explained at length by my participants. Sanyii summed up government
resistance to providing educational opportunities as a well-designed plot: “That's what the
government planned for them, to give them [Oromos] a lack of education so they can't
understand each other, so they can't organize, they can't do something together.” This
intentional division helps legitimize Habesha rule. In cases where educational access was
open, the subject matter and manner of operating was still of concern. Participants shared
at length how the system punished Oromumma. Ebba explained:
If you say a word in Oromo at school then the class manager, as we call it,
she write [sic] his name… Then you're gonna go to the principal and they
will… gosh. That means they will whoop you like five, ten, fifteen times
or something like that. Just because you said a word in your own
language. And plus you don't know the word in the other language!
In each institution, Habesha culture and anti-Oromo sentiment worked together to
promote, establish, and normalize the settler colony.
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Meeting, challenging, and in many ways working in dialect with the Habesha
settler colonial project were Oromo practices that sought to reimagine statehood. As an
Organizing Theme, this re-imagination is characterized by new understandings of
sovereignty and solidarity, and institutions that exist outside of state reach and control.
Abdi noted that “Oromos are really reinforcing now. The force is still… really forceful,
demands are high, to control the land and the resources.” These demands echo the
organization and practices of groups like the OLF who refused to give in to the Ethiopian
state’s oppression. Where the Ethiopian educational system functioned through violence
and erasure, Oromo people and groups turned to alternative organizations to carry their
people forward. This includes both OLF schools and the oral traditions and narratives that
survived on the margins of the state. These organizations, though not necessarily statelike, have the power to fill in the gaps left by formal state structures. Sanyii imagines a
return to this way of life, an idyllic and ideal Oromiya: “Everyone guides you… even like
people you don't know. Everyone will protect you. Whoever it is, what kind of child it is,
it doesn't matter the race or their father, anything. Everyone will protect you. That's the
kind of society.” This collaborative system is a demonstration of Oromo visions for
societal organization and operations in forms beyond the state. Oromos recognize a value
in sharing knowledge that doesn’t require submitting to violent institutions.
Stretching sovereignty is the other key mechanism through which the Oromo
challenged statehood. By working together over and beyond state boundaries, Oromo
people are legitimized and able to act as a free people. Tolera explains that “today's
media and social media is worldwide. People are seeing. American people are seeing.
Now this puts a huge pressure on the government of Ethiopia.” If the Oromo people
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relied only on the Ethiopian state, Oromiya would remain underdeveloped. Within
Ethiopia, “They don't have road, they don't have health care centers… compared to other
regions Oromiya didn't benefit from the past 27 years, or even before that,” Chalchissa
explains. As such, the Oromo seek alternate institutions that can meet these needs. The
diaspora gives the cause an international angle, and this attention opens up possibilities
for what Ethiopia can and should mean for the people it rules. Returning to the larger
category of political politicization, understanding both Ethiopia as a Habesha settler
colony and Oromos reimagining statehood as Organizing Themes makes sense of the
state’s political actions, interactions with the Oromo, and nature of Oromo politicization
over time. These networks are displayed as Figure 5.2 and 5.3 below.

Citizenship in the sky
• First and secondclass

Ethiopia is
a Habesha
settler
colony

Discrimination is
embedded in
institutions
• Education
• Legal systems/
rights
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FIGURE 5.3: Organizing Themes- Political Resistance
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Cultural Politicization
Entertaining Amhara
The Ethiopian state’s manipulation of cultural traits and heritage as a way to exclude the
Oromo people from justice is one of the most egregious and consistent forms
of cultural imperialism and Other-ing used by the Ethiopian state was clearly identifiable.
Ebba explained that “If you are Oromo, if they figure out you are Oromo, there is no
way… [that you will] get an opportunity.” Enforcing cultural imperialism ensures that
only select cultural traits lead to power, and that the empire is responsible for enforcing
these identities whenever possible. Where the Habesha elites could not convert or
overwhelm cultural inheritance they enacted a campaign of shame and Othering, and
those who did not conform to the mainstream were pushed to the margins of society
(Jalata 2001; Feyissa and Lawrence 2014). Oromo people understand the cultural
imperial project and felt its impact in a much more uniform and explicit way than any
other form of oppression. Wayissa, who spent the first 20 years of his life under the reign
of Haile Selassie in the 1950s and 60s, erupted into peals of laughter when asked whether
he thought Habesha and Oromumma identity were equally represented in Ethiopia:
“Ethiopian cultural identity? [laughter] Equal? [laughter] No! [laughter] Not at all!”
Asked for a specific example, Wayissa referred to the way historic policies and social
norms restricted Oromo cultural development. "If Oromo speaks on radio, it breaks radio’
that’s what they used to say,” he added, though he was no longer laughing, pointing out
that sources of Oromo culture, including churches and schools, were instead filled by
Amharic-speakers and re-settled Amhara people. By placing value on one culture and set
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of practices above all others, disparities were legitimized and made transferrable.
Cultural imperialism in the Ethiopian settler colonial state embedded itself into state-run
institutions as a way to further its violence.
The continual re-colonization and suppression of Oromo culture was both formal
and informal. That is, it was both a result of explicit state policies, and reinforced by
social structures. Obsee noted that
Even if one [Habesha] family comes in a town of two thousand, three
thousand- ‘Oh then you … need to speak my language.’ They used to do
that! The law supported them, because that's called Ethiopian language.
Then you have to give up on your culture, whatever, and you have to
follow that particular person.
While societal pressure may contribute to some groups choosing to speak Amharic, the
legacy of legality, wherein Amharic was the only option, was what originally legitimized
this pressure. That the prevalence of Amharic and Habeshization in the post-colonial
nation state were rooted in the entire colonial process was also well understood by my
participants. Many participants noted that Ethiopian elites exemplified this minority
ethnic rule. Despite the fact that some past leaders “might share blood line with Oromo
they were, like, entertaining Amhara culture. That’s why the federal working language in
Ethiopia now is Amharic. Historically it's because of that ideology in the emperor and the
kings’ minds,” Biiftu explained. This “ideology” was one of Habesha supremacy, and its
reach was deeply penetrative.
Nevertheless, there were some cases where the economic and infrastructural
development worked against this state project, as was the case in far Western Oromiya,
the same place where the OLF resistance lasted the longest. Participants from this area
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had generally more positive experiences keeping their culture. However, this was seen
as a rare privilege. Tolera acknowledged that that
I am lucky to be from far west side where it is a little bit more, where
Oromos can keep their identity… But some of the rest, especially the
eastern, southeast, and central part, I couldn’t keep my name the way it is.
I would’ve been forced to change my name to Amharic. That’s where you
start [oppressing Oromo culture].
As ideologies that embed themselves into governance, cultural imperialism and Othering
work in tandem to keep Oromos from harnessing their power. Although the current Prime
Minister was generally spoken of highly, it was noted that he hasn’t really, fully reached
the Oromo people yet, despite being Oromo himself. Geography was one specific
example of this shortcoming, as Obsee explained: “When there are problems in rural
Oromiya, he doesn’t go. Only to places like Agaro [near Jimma] or Hawassa [major city
near the capital].” Oromo people, and many other ethnic groups, have been
geographically and culturally pushed to the margins. This example also demonstrates
how one legacy of the imperial cultural project is a turn to Othering: when state elites are
unable to enforce hegemony, they suppress or silence those who deviate. The Oromo
people are Othered by the state in this relegation to the margins.. Chalchissa summed this
up well: “So that's the plan: to just get rid of language, culture, and then identity. Then
cancel the name of Oromos from that area.” Despite the effectiveness of the cultural
imperial project, the Othering of the Oromo was also a common practice.
Othering is seen in the systematic exclusion of certain identities from the
mainstream. In practice, Oromo people identified Othering in instances where their
history and their existence were misrepresented or left out of the conversation altogether
because of their Oromo identity. This demonization was typically a counterpoint to the
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idealized Habesha identity cultivated by the state. Despite its ethnic diversity, and “all
these cultures and all these things, all the whole world talks about in Ethiopia is the
Northerns' culture” Sanyii explained. Going further, he added that “those people who call
themselves Habesha, they don’t include the other national people. They don’t include like
Gurage, Afar, Somali, all the others. Only Amhara and Tigray.” This exclusion restricts
the growth and cultural development of the Oromo.
As long as certain cultural values and norms are deemed unacceptable,
marginalized groups are forced to either assimilate or face systematic challenges as the
result of these traits. Connecting historic erasure to internalized shame and assimilation,
Badhaassaa noted that the pressure to assimilate was rooted in a cultural imperial project:
It's because of the dominancy the [Habesha] culture had over the past 150
years, because it's from that culture that the emperor, the king, and
everybody came from. Other cultures were forgotten. You have to merge
into this culture to survive.
Requiring marginalized people and indigenous nations to assimilate into the dominant
culture is characteristic of state-sponsored oppression.

Cultural resistance: not a debatable topic
The Oromo people do not simply accept state attempts to rewrite or erase their
history. Instead, Oromo people are working to reclaim and critically interrogate the
narratives and practices that have been built up against them. Abdi, who was born in the
1950s in Western Wollega, refused to even entertain the idea of a comparison between
the nationalism of the Abyssinians and the Oromo resistance. When asked about his own
Ethiopian national identity he said, clearly: “I am Oromian, I am an Oromo, born Oromo.
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I identify myself to the Oromo people and the Oromo nation, Oromiya.” By refusing
any attempt to assimilate or even simply embed Oromiya into the Ethiopian state project,
Abdi both reclaims control of the narrative and asserts Oromo autonomy. Though more
radical than some other participants’ perspectives, this assertion is exemplary of
survivance. Despite all attempts by the Ethiopian state, Oromiya is still there, and its
ability to survive is the result of this project of resistance.
By acknowledging historic erasure and challenging its perpetuation, Oromos
resist Abyssinian hegemony. As Ayantu inquired about cultural clothing, “It looks like
Amhara's dress. Does that mean Ethiopia's dress? That's a debatable topic.” These types
of debates begin to probe deeper into the hegemonic nature of state culture. A generation
or even a decade ago, this line of questioning could land one in jail or subject one to
terrorism laws. Ethiopia had sought to perpetuate its Habesha hegemony to the extreme.
As a modern force of resistance, however, reclaiming and reanalyzing these accepted
ideas has led to concrete actions. Chalchissa explains:
Now the Oromos say no. We're supposed to be treated this way, as
Ethiopians we're supposed to have this equal right, even if we are
Oromos... If were not gonna be treated equally the same way, if we cannot
practice our language, our religion, then we don’t belong here.
Taking ownership over the value of Oromo culture is a key aspect of reclaiming it, and
defining Oromumma on Oromo terms. Despite the Ethiopian state’s myriad attempts to
push Oromos out of the conversation, or demonize them, they continue to fight, and are
shedding new light on these nationalistic narratives.
Understanding Oromo survival as an active part of the resistance movement is a
way of acknowledging what it has taken to get to this point. “If according to the pressure
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from the government and from the system we would’ve been vanished,” Gifti noted.
Oromos from the most remote areas pointed to the ways that lack of access to Ethiopian
modernity reinforced their culture, as Wayissa remembers: “We even don’t know what is
Ethiopia during childhood until we go to school… we know only Oromo.” From this
perspective, Oromo Othering was reframed as a way of resisting state violence; in the
margins of society, where the state tried to silence and forget, the resistance carried on.
Elaborating on this same idea — the way exclusion from access in fact strengthened
Oromo cultural qualities— Sanyii explains, “Even though you know about Ethiopia, you
are not attached to Ethiopia, you were not grown up as Ethiopian. You were raised as
Oromo.” Reclaiming an independent identity despite the imperialist tactics of the state is
a way to resist violence. The survival of Oromo language, culture, and heritage is in and
of itself a resistance to erasure and Othering. Biiftu makes this clear, “We don’t know
what will happen, but Oromos are silent no more.”
A close read of the way my participants related to Ethiopia also revealed some
deeper forms of resistance. Looking at Addis Ababa as an example, the naming,
claiming, and hyper-development of the capital was all done without the consent of the
Oromo people, to whom the land originally belonged. Many of my participants made a
point to refer to the city only as Finfinnee, the pre-colonial name, and used feminine
pronouns when referring to “her.” This follows the linguistic patterns of Afan Oromo, but
also acts as a way of reclaiming and resisting Ethiopia’s exploitation and profiteering,
and contrasts with their reference to the government as “he.” I argue that these are
instances of reclaiming because they deny separation, renaming, and colonial narratives
that encourage Habeshization and Oromo suppression. Instead, these short examples
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show the potential for Oromos to take back their autonomy. As Abdi explains, the
Oromo people are “yearning for democracy, peace, and justice.” And until these
yearnings are addressed, they will not stop resisting.

Organizing Themes
Throughout the history of Ethiopian state cultural relations, there have been
attempts to eliminate the Other. This idea organizes and makes sense of many of the
other common practices. The elimination of the Other is enacted through eradicating and
erasing cultures that don’t fit the state created cultural model. In Ethiopia, these attempts
were enacted through an unwillingness to “entertain” or even acknowledge other cultures.
If the Ethiopian hegemonic model had been successful, all members of the nation would
speak the same language, and all other ways of understanding would be erased. More
broadly, the elimination of the Other was identifiable in cases of enforced homogeny and
intentional erasure. Enforced homogeny can also be understood as the Habeshization or
Amharization of the Oromo as a necessary precursor to societal acceptance. Obsee
explained that “According to any of the Northern [sic]… the qualification is to be
Ethiopian is you have to speak Amharic.” She elaborated later that this was a survival
tactic more than anything else, referring to the expansion of Finfinnee, during which “the
cultures started to be dominated, and people started learning Amharic to survive.” By
linking cultural qualities to integration into society, and even survival, Ethiopia has
sought to create a singular “Ethiopian” identity regardless of the impact on Oromo and
other cultures. Participants shared their stories of being forced to learn Amharic, or
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considered lucky to keep their Oromo names, as Ebba shared. These cultural practices
sought to homogenize Ethiopia into one Habesha population.
Supporting this drive for homogeneity was an erasure of those identities and
practices that wouldn’t conform. Intentional erasure is also an educational practice, as
discussed in the “Political” section. However, as a cultural practice this can be seen in
Ethiopia’s presentation of itself in a way that excludes Oromo heritage. This “Northern”
image of Ethiopia is flawed because rather than highlighting national diversity, it acts as
if there are no differences at all. Biiftu explained that it was because of this erasure that
Oromo “history, our culture, and our identity have been hidden for so long.” Oromo
people challenge this erasure with their very existence, and each attempt at homogeneity
and silencing is met with Oromo resistance.
There was not one overarching theme for Oromo cultural resistance, however it
can be understood generally as survival itself as a practice of resistance, what Vizenor
calls survivance (2009). This Oromo survivance took the shape of two distinct subthemes: an Ethiopia for everybody, and when this was not thought to be feasible, an
Oromia reclaimed. These two connecting concepts are both representative of resistance
to an elimination of the Other, though they don’t necessarily represent the same end
result. Ethiopia for everybody is a conceptualization of a national identity and set of
ideologies that include and celebrate all peoples. This also means an acknowledgement of
the violent historical practices that allowed for the imposition of Habesha hegemony in
the first place, a recognition that is made possible through a reclaimed and redesigned
state. In many ways, until Oromo institutions and ideas are restored in value, there will
continue to be a resistance to state models. Oromos refuse to be the Other, resist all
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efforts of elimination, and continue to seek an equitable voice in the narratives about
their existence. As Ebba made clear: “By nature we are democratic… Oromos don’t want
to oppress anybody. We always like to have equality. Equality over the resources that we
have, over power, culture, everything.” An Ethiopia for all would make room for these
ideas.
In addition, these demands are part of the project of reclaiming Oromiya. An
Oromiya reclaimed is an Oromiya that gives respect and legitimacy to the existence and
belief of its original inhabitants. In the face of a state that “did not consider you as a
human being,” as Gifti says, Oromos must assert their rights and the fullness of their
culture, including sovereignty over the soul of Oromiya. Until that reclaiming,
Badhaassaa insists, “We're really far away from being considered as we're one country or
one Ethiopia.” As Organizing Themes, recognizing how these concepts make sense of
cultural relationships over time is a key step in the analytical process. Denying the
historic narratives and theft that mischaracterized and threatened Oromo identity is one of
the biggest challenges of the resistance project.
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FIGURE 5.4: Organizing Themes- Cultural Oppression
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Conclusion
This chapter has used the voices of my participants to illuminate the way Oromo
people in the diaspora understand and make sense of their identity and its relationship to
the Ethiopian state. Furthermore, it has painted a picture of the nature of Oromo
politicization in the diaspora; with specific attention to the way that politicization as a
process works with multiple technologies, institutions, and strategies to enact oppressive
tendencies. Politicization of Oromo identity began with the very formation of the state.
Interview participants highlighted the way customs and systems were set up to exclude
Oromo people from equitable access. Education was a clear example: the government
refused to build Oromo schools, and when educational institutions were created they
quickly turned into spaces that spread anti-Oromo sentiment and allowed for physical
violence against Oromo bodies. As a politicization process, Oromo oppression was
normalized and facilitated by the state.
This chapter has also shed light on the way practices of resistance grow alongside
and in dialectic with this violent politicization. Oromo people in the diaspora clearly
identified the way the state project has treated their people and their homeland, as well as
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the justification behind this treatment. Ethiopia has consistently manipulated Oromo
identity for exclusionary, marginalizing, and unjust aims. In analyzing the thematic
connections in each domain of oppression, it is clear that Oromumma in the diaspora is
deeply politicized. This connection will be elaborated on further in the final chapter.
In the Economic domain, Oromo people described the way exploitation and
marginalization characterized the nature of their relationships with the state. Ethiopia
consistently excluded Oromo people from access to economic advances or over-rewarded
Northern elites. As a politicization process, these oppressive tactics have used ethnic
identity as the primary means of delineating elite access, thus enshrining Oromos and all
others into the margins. A close look at the Political domain makes clear that state
institutions and legal policies have failed to create a space for the Oromo people. Instead,
these institutions manipulate Oromumma as a way of designating differential
citizenships. In response to this, Oromo people organize outside of and against the state
model. Thus Oromo identity in the political domain is used as a way to build
organizations that resemble state forms and do the work of state institutions, without
formal nation-state recognition. The third and final domain, the Cultural, demonstrates
most clearly how traits and traditions are used to determine access to power across the
Ethiopian state. Oromo people of all ages shared their stories of the pressure to convert or
collapse their Oromo identity into the Habesha ideal. Each aspect of Oromumma was
Othered, abused, or ostracized. In response, Oromo people are working to take back the
power of Oromo identity, and interrupt expectations of what it means to be Ethiopian.
Oromo language and heritage are being celebrated in a new way, and this celebration also
works to gain back Oromo rights and power.
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CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Introduction
The preceding chapters have thoroughly described the historic nature of Oromo
politicization, the way it has changed over time, and the way Oromo people understand
this process. This chapter will connect these various issues, and, following the thematic
network analysis, unite them under a few Global Themes. The Global Themes discussed
here address Oromo politicization and also sum up the ideas, including the Organizing
Themes, presented throughout the course of the previous analysis. After an explanation of
these Global Themes, this chapter will conclude by posing some suggestions for future
research.

Global Theme I: All Ethiopian identities are political
All of the identities that have emerged from or are embedded into the Ethiopian
state project are politicized; parts of each group’s ethnic heritage have been used to
determine their access to rights and power over time. The most salient example of this
phenomenon is in the mandated national language policy. Once Amharic became a
legally enforced standard form of communication, all other languages became barriers to
accessing resources and understanding rights. As a Global Theme, recognizing the
political nature of Ethiopian identities makes sense of the way state policies have been
implemented against and experienced by the Oromo over time. The foundation of the
Ethiopian state and the ideologies that supported it are deeply entrenched in modern state
policies, systems of governance, and institutions. The politicizing processes that made the
emergence of the Ethiopian state possible have continued to operate. Therefore,
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understanding all identities that emerge from Ethiopia to be political in nature gives a
coherence to the way they have been developed, oppressed, and enforced over time.
Uniting this Global Theme are three Organizing Themes, described below. The model for
this thematic network can be found on page 129.

Social relationships are commoditized
The commoditization of social relationships is necessary for the colonization,
development, and oppression of the Oromo. This idea is best demonstrated through the
Nafxanya-Gabbar system and the development of Finfinnee, and the legacies of these
processes. Northern Ethiopians moved onto Oromo land, renamed it, and did their best to
erase the heritage of the place; Oromo existence was understood only as servant, slave,
and economic resource. Given these constructs, relationships were commodified,
understood only through the lens of market potential. Once Northerners were settled on
Oromo land, and their children had grown up and gone through school with Oromo
tenants, never learning Oromo language or culture, the commoditization of social
relationships became normalized. Thus reimagining relationships outside of this system is
a radical upheaval. Attempting to reframe Oromo land as a home, rather than a producer
of profit, and reimagining Oromo people as more than serfs are challenges that elites
were not motivated to undertake. There was no financial motivation to learn Afan Oromo
or respect Oromo culture. With Finfinnee, the seemingly endless urban expansion fails to
make real improvements to the lives of the Oromo community. This prioritization is felt
both by evicted farmers and settled outsiders, who see that Finfinnee as a global hub of
business and trade is not designed for the Oromo to exist in. In addition to these
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examples, the Ethiopian government’s treatment of environmental and social issues
also shows an overwhelming focus on protecting commodities, markets, and future
profits above all else (Tufa and Gebremariam 2017).

The Other must be eliminated
The forceful nature of Habeshization, erasure as an educational project with
cultural connections, and the illegality of language are all processes that contributed to
the elimination of the non-Habesha from the cultural consciousness. As is the case with
the commoditization of social relations, it is the long-lasting legacies of these projects
that are cause for concern, as much as their current implications. Although state language
and cultural policies have become more liberal and open over time, the systematic
dismantling of several generations worth of cultural development is not easily undone,
nor necessarily being encouraged. Ethiopian nationalists will continue to make the case
for assimilation, and even as Oromos take strides towards visibility they are still far from
a having an open or equitable voice, despite their population size. This lingering
exclusion complicates other marginalized groups’ existence as well, and demonstrates the
real unwillingness of the Ethiopian state to compromise.

Discrimination is embedded in institutions
The linguistic and cultural supremacy that the Habesha-dominated Ethiopian state
has undertaken since its founding is firmly entrenched in state institutions on all levels.
The enforced ethnic hierarchy is seen most clearly in the way education, as a state
institution, is run. For decades there were enforced limitations on who could learn, and
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how. Even for universally accessible institutions, like the legal system, there are vast
disparities in the way it is carried out and who it serves. The illegality of Oromumma
over time justified imprisonment and exclusion. By embedding discrimination into
institutions, the state obfuscated its role in discriminatory policies, and the subjective
violence of these practices, but it could not hide them altogether. Identifying
discrimination in legal policies is the first step to their dismantling, discussed in the
following section. The commoditization of social relations, treatment of the Other, and
discriminatory state practices demonstrate the way the Ethiopian state uses ethnic traits as
a political tool. This politicization, and the oppression embedded in it, works in tandem
with the second Global Theme. Figure 6.1 displayed below, shows the thematic network
connecting and making sense of the first Global Theme.
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FIGURE 6.1 Global Theme I
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Global Theme II: Oromo sovereignty is a non-state political project
This Global Theme is a way of cohering the historic organization and resistance
project of the Oromo people, as well as its legitimacy in the eyes of the Oromo. By
operating outside and despite the oppressive state, Oromos use politicizing tactics and
systems to deny state oppression and create institutional support beyond what Ethiopia
provides. These tools include revitalizing Oromo language and culture as a way to build
stronger group connections, and organizing these groups as a coalition for justice. This
resistance project has long lived in the shadows and margins, and has been characterized
by a constantly evolving response to new state violence. This ability of the resistance to
reimagine itself is made possible by its historic exclusion; functioning outside of the state
has allowed Oromos to become comfortable with new, and more radical forms of
resistance. As a Global Theme, understanding the political legitimacy and need for this
movement is essential to making sense of the ways Oromo people operate under the
Ethiopian state. There are three connecting networks of ideas that highlight how non-state
organization demonstrates the real potential for a liberated or decolonized Oromiya.

Oromiya reclaimed
Reclaiming Oromiya means specifically addressing each of the ways she has been
affected by the Ethiopian state. Reclaiming is not a re-colonization; it does not intend to
repeat the process of selective uprooting and erasure that the Abyssinians employed.
Rather, Oromiya is reclaimed by a renewed recognition and sense of legitimacy given to
the organizations and practices that define the Oromo’s ideal state model. The most
inspiring example is the possible re-entry of the OLF into mainstream politics, which has
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potential to bring about real change. The OLF, which was born of and very much
defined the Oromo struggle, has the ability to truly alter the fabric of Ethiopian state
institutions. As a reclaiming, this asserts that Oromo people are in control of their own
destiny, and have ideas about their sovereignty that they intend to see actualized.
Reclaiming Oromiya also means creating narratives and shared understandings that both
celebrate and highlight the rich history of the Oromo people, while honestly portraying
their adversities.

Statehood reimagined
By reimaging statehood and state power, the Oromo attempt to address the needs
the state won’t fulfill through the creation of alternative institutions. By simultaneously
acknowledging Ethiopia’s inadequacies, and creating culturally-specific models and ways
of addressing them, Oromo people are asserting their sovereign potential. In some ways it
is this imagination that most threatens the Ethiopian state. If Oromo people had the
ability to leverage their resources and build their own partnerships, they could create
institutions that allowed for independent and equitable access to healthcare, roads,
education, and other necessary resources. As it currently stands they have limited and
restricted access to those goods and services, and thus non-state education and the
diaspora have come to function as alternative institutions: the diaspora as a source of
media and news, as well as financial resources, and cultural education as a practice that
undermines Ethiopian state strategies. Both of these examples undermine the formal state
structure, and demonstrate Oromo ability to organize outside of state lines.
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Challenging Ethiopian institutions
While the previous theme represents a more creative force, this concluding point
is more destructive in nature. Ethiopian citizenship is characterized by inequity, from the
law to the market. By demanding equal rights within the state, in addition to employing
non-state sovereign practices, Oromos seek to rise above Ethiopia’s restrictions. They are
developing a better state model, and fighting for reform within the existing structures.
Although the diasporic nature of Oromo sovereignty has already stretched beyond state
borders, finding justice within Ethiopia means addressing each injustice, and the first
major violence against the Oromo was Ethiopian colonization. The legitimacy, equity,
and structure of many Ethiopian state and political systems still need to be called into
question. A full transformation, not just reformation, is necessary to meet the demand of
an “Ethiopia for everybody.” Without a restructuring of the settler colonial model and the
institutions that uphold it, marginalization and oppression will continue to rule. Figure
6.2, displayed on the following page, shows the network of ideas and Organizing Themes
that comprise the second Global Theme.

Discussion
After a thorough analysis of the literature, extensive time spent in Oromiya, and
interviews with members of the Oromo diaspora, what is clear is that the violence done to
the Oromo may have changed its face, but not its impact. Across generations and
geographic distances, Oromo people I interviewed, historical Oromo accounts, and the
histories I learned while living in Ethiopia were filled with hauntingly similar stories and
were targeted by similar attacks, often at the hands of the state, and justified by their
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Oromumma. Thus, in response to the first research question, I argue that that this
relationship with the state has been one of the primary forces affecting the development
of Oromumma, Oromo cultural identity. Although it has evolved as a force of resistance
in its own right, much of Oromo cultural development occurred despite its erasure and
silencing by Ethiopian state, or in spite of it.
This answer leads to the second research question, which asked about the factors
most influential on Oromumma in the diaspora. It became clear that to be Oromo
anywhere is to carry with one a violent political heritage. Conceptualizing an Oromumma
that is separated from the Ethiopian state legally, politically, and economically, is close to
impossible. Although the spirit and culture of Oromumma has resisted Habesha
hegemony, relationships to the land have wedded these two cultures together in ways that
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are more difficult to untangle. The legacy of the settler colonial project is embedded
into every Oromo-Ethiopian interaction, and the options for withdrawal are few, if not
nonexistent. Oromo people have not expressed a desire to return any genocidal favors;
they know that by uprooting the descendants of settlers they would only continue the
cycle of violence, no matter how just their cause. They emphasize a need for peace far
more than justice. This was shared by my interview participants, as well as Oromo
activists1, 2. Ebba was insistent on closing his interview with this particular statement,
also shared in the previous chapter: “By nature we are democratic… Oromos don’t want
to oppress anybody. We always like to have equality.” It is also true, however, that
“justice” as a system and institution of Ethiopia has never been just to the Oromo. They
will no longer be appeased by settler logic. Thus, although there is reason to be hopeful,
until there are real steps taken to dismantle the entrenched hierarchy and exploitation of
the settler state and political elites, this hope is limited.

Conclusion
In closing, and in order to develop some next steps for this research, I would like
to place Ethiopia in the context of its peers, internationally and locally. By understanding
Ethiopia as one piece of a larger world system, it becomes clear that the Oromo are not
alone in their struggle. How does Ethiopia, as a settler colony, mirror the practices of rule
used in more established settler colonies like the United States or Israel, and what lessons

1

Oromo Press, via twitter (@oromopress), accessed June 20 2019,
https://twitter.com/oromopress/status/791667888763437057
2 OromoRoot, via twitter (@Sanyiikoo_Oromo), accessed June 20 2019
https://twitter.com/Sanyiikoo_Oromo/status/1041614782691008513
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can be learned from struggles for liberation in these lands? How closely is Ethiopia, as
a burgeoning neoliberal nation state, following the steps taken by other economic
powerhouses, and what are the risks of this aggressive development? Will the rise of
Prime Minster Abiy Ahmed, the “Obama of East Africa”, lead to actual tangible change,
or serve merely to check a diversity box in a violent demography (Mohammed, Lemma,
Giorgis, Nega, Shide 2018)? The global themes that link this research together are also
intertwined with these questions. In the face of post-colonial former empires that
continue to demonstrate imperial tendencies, struggles for liberation, justice, and freedom
that are globally-minded and emphasize solidarity and shared organizing become
increasingly important.
A natural continuation of this research project would be to expand it, and push it
further east. In many ways the tensions and violence between Somalis and Oromos are a
colonial legacy, one which, if mitigated, would have great potential for bringing peace to
the Horn of Africa. How has the experience of the Somali diaspora, oppressed by both
Ethiopian and British colonial forces, differed from that of the Oromo? Furthermore,
along the Ethiopia-Somali-Kenyan borderlands are groups of nomadic peoples like the
Ogaden, who may speak languages from all three countries and yet identify with none.
How can these people be supported in their struggle to exist outside of three unstable
states? What happened to the spirit that supported Somali pirate radio purveyors of the
1960s, the first few souls brave enough to play Oromo voices on the radio? How has the
silencing of the Ogaden Nation across the Horn directly contributed to the
marginalization of the OLF in Ethiopia? What influence will Ethiopia’s moves towards
justice have on the Eritrean dictatorship, if any? Are these modern resistance movements,
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the #OromoProtests and the burgeoning Eritrean #Yiakl1 campaign, part of a global
trend against post-colonial state violence? And if so, how will these campaigns connect
and interrupt the privileged powers of the global North? These questions are beyond the
scope of this thesis. But it is this work that helps to locate and relocate the bones of these
bodies, and it is this work that moves towards freedom.
The title of this project describes what I have attempted to do: to locate and relocate the roots of Oromo cultural identity in the face of extensive, oppressive,
politicization. Through this exploration, I have also built an understanding of which
Oromo bodies belong to these bones, what Ethiopian practices of death allowed these
actions, and most importantly, what Oromo life has been created in its wake. The Oromo
people have demonstrated extraordinary resilience and grace in the face of generational
violence, and they have not yet grown tired. For every condo built on the capital, for
every unwritten Oromo historiography, for each and every drop of blood spilled on a
school campus; Oromos remember. And for every time a voice sings out in Afan Oromo,
for every Oromo student who walks across a graduation stage, and for every season the
Odaa tree grows on; Oromos do not forget. This memory, these bones, are what
strengthen the Oromo people and carry them onward towards liberation.

The hashtag #Yiakl, meaning Enough in Tigrigna, is part of a social media movement that is slowly
gaining traction, accessed May 15, 2019: https://twitter.com/emdhrorg/status/1087428940501843969
1
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APPENDIX A: NAMES
Oromos and Ethiopia people do not use family names in the same way as
Americans. Instead, one’s second name is that of their father, then his father, and going
back. When signing official documents the first name is followed by the father’s name,
and then the grandfather’s. Even in formal settings, an honorific would be followed by
the individual’s first name. Referring to the former Prime Minister as Mr. Zenawi, for
example, would be incorrect according to both Oromo and Ethiopian custom. However,
this practice typically stops when individuals enter the diaspora. Without personal
knowledge of an individual’s background it is impossible to discern if they have adopted
the Western practice of a family name, or prefer to be referenced by their first name. As
such, and for the sake of uniformity, I have followed Western practices and used second
names for all in-text citations.
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APPENDIX B: MAPS
The following pages show a series of maps. The first map, Figure 1, was made by
Bulcha, an Oromo scholar, in 2002, and shows a larger version of Oromia, with lines
through it that indicate the path of state formation. This version, Huntingford’s 1955 map
(Figure 2), and the map completed by the Oromo Liberation Front (Figure 3), all
similarly show the historic Oromo land stretching much further North into Amhara. Of
importance about Huntingford’s map in particular is that he had no vested interest in
Ethiopian state politics, and if anything showed pro-Ethiopian state or anti-Oromo
tendencies, as evidenced by his reference to the Oromo people as Galla, and his
descriptions throughout the text from which this map was taken. The fact that this
depiction aligns closely with the OLF model, designed decades later, grants it further
validity, and further challenges Ethiopia’s chosen boundaries.
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Figure 1: Bulcha Map Made by Bulcha (2002) an Oromo scholar, depicting Shoan (Shawan) expansion
during the colonial era.
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Figure 2: Map from Huntingford (1955) The Galla of Ethiopia and the Kingdoms of Kaffa and Janjero.
The clearest difference is that Huntingford depicts Oromo territory, called Galla by him, as including the
Wollo people, stretching all the way North into Tigray (Raya).
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Figure 3: Oromo Liberation Front Map taken from their website (no date provided)
Accessed 20 May 2019: (http://oromoliberationfront.org/OromiaBriefs.htm)
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APPENDIX C: METHODS
Table 1: Sample of transcription (with preliminary codes added)
TIME QUOTE
1335 Education is the same, work is even worse.
1342 That's why you don't see many Oromos living in the Central or
in the biggest cities. [Lists cities + regions]
Most of the time they give up even education. Because you're
not gonna get anywhere. It doesn’t matter.
1400 That [exclusion from education and jobs] was very intentionally
designed to keep the Oromos down.
1420 Even in the military, they're kind of not really confident, if
Oromos get this position, because they're the largest population
in the country, they're kind of worried they might take over.
Historically the Oromos did have these well-known fighters.
And no one could beat them. [historical data/ years]
They [the government] knew that history [Oromo fighters] so
for that reason that really keeps them down because if those
people get a chance they will take over the country.
No matter what. Educationally, job and business, everything.
They try to keep them down.
1500 TADESSE BIRU - Selassie advisor, hid his Oromo identity, then
switched to rebel party, killed by government
1820 Even though the resources, everything is from Oromo region,
from Oromos, still they don’t appreciate it. And then they try to
put you down.

E S C B
1

§

1
§

1
1

1

1

1

§

1

§

§

§

1
1

1

§

§
§

1

Table 2: Sample of Coding, Political
EXCERPT:
This intentional kind of eradicating Oromos from their land.
It's not really about the plan, it's to really really wipe out
Oromos from that region. And the expansion just continues
nonstop.
The reason behind that… if they expand from corner to corner
in all ways, limitlessly, the ultimate goal was to split Oromos
into different regions.
This kind of is to make Oromos powerless, I think that's the
plan
That is why the young generation, the Qeerro, they start to
protest about that.

§

N S O Sv
1

1
1
1
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All the northerners were happy about it because this is the
intention was to split Oromos into 5 different regions. Because,
back in the days, like I said, the West started from Wollega all
the way to Harar, and then all the way north to Wollo, like the
majority of the country was Oromo. What they used to do was
they divided it by region: Arsi, Wollega, Jimma, or something
like this. This was intentionally designed in a way, they used to
give them different names. The Harar Oromos they used to call
them Qootuu... so the Arsis or the Harars they never thought
that Wellegas are also Oromos like them.
They divided the country all this time. That's what gives them
[northerners] a chance to keep Oromos down all these years.
Now Oromos become aware of who they are, they know their
identity; Oromos are Oromos. They became together.

Also
C.I.

1

1
1

1

Table 3: Basic Themes and Key Features
Organizing themes:

Economic

Political

Cultural

Theoretical:
Exploitation
Marginalization
Mobilization
Transformation
Business
Trade
Commodification
Subordination
Necropower
Organization
Sovereignty
Education
Law
Political parties
Cultural Imperialism
Other-ing
Reclaiming
Survivance
Language
Religion
Culture

Specific:
Nafxanya/ Gabbar
Addis Ababa Master Plan
Grand Renaissance Dam

Oromo Protests
Irreecha
OLF
TPLF
EPRDF

Habesha
Orthodox Christian
Oromumma (language,
religion, homeland)
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